After writing my doctoral dissertation, the focus of my research on conspiracy theories broadened and I became interested in the broader phenomenon of disinformation.  In my dissertation, I identified conspiracy theories as collectively motivated cognition, i.e. as motivated (and thus distorted) psychological phenomena serving group interests, but still serving to make sense of the world. I have taken this thesis further and published it as a book chapter in English in an edited volume on the psychology of conspiracy theories.  Together with research colleagues at ELTE, we also conducted experimental studies. In these studies, we sought to answer the question of how individuals can be immunised against conspiracy theories. Our results showed that ridicule and rational argumentation were the most effective tools against conspiracy theories. This latter result may seem surprising in the light of the fact that public discourse on "post-truth" has traditionally emphasised the exclusivity of emotions as the background to false beliefs and the possibilities for dismantling them. This result, however, fits well with the theoretical concept of "motivated collective cognition", which points to the interconnections and entanglements of cognition (often driven by collective identity) and emotions in the background of conspiracy theorists' beliefs.  At the same time, the Department of Social Psychology at the ELTE PPK conducted studies on the attitudinal background of the acceptance of non-conspiracy, so-called "wish-fulfilling fake news". The results show that a strong political bias is the main factor that predisposes to the acceptance of pseudo-news . This is not self-evident, as previous research has suggested a more important role for cognitive capacity than emotion-driven thinking in the background of believing in pseudo-news . The role of intergroup conflict and its absolutisation, "tribalism", in the acceptance of disinformation is also being investigated in further ongoing empirical research. In 2018, I published a scholarly book on the social psychology of conspiracy theories and disinformation, which was well received and very popular - for example, it was a semi-finalist in the 2019 Golden Book voting, among the top ten most popular books in the Popular Science category. In line with our research, the book (which has been the basis for many public, popular presentations) emphasises the 'normality' of conspiracy theories (and susceptibility to disinformation) and sharply contrasts approaches that attribute conspiracy theories to individual pathologies and thought deformations. The core of the strongly social psychological approach is that susceptibility to disinformation is general. It also means that no one is immune: we are all susceptible to being misled by our biases and superficialities, partly regardless of political affiliation and education. The main motives for believing in political pseudo-news are group-based and ideological. I have tried to demonstrate this in a case study on the social psychological background of Turanian conspiracy theory origins myths.

Traditionally, foreign policy has been one of the least 'politicised' areas, with governments often interested in keeping their foreign policy decisions out of the domestic political debate. Recently, and especially since Russia's annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014, there have been interesting changes in European public opinion: opinions on Russia have become more polarised and much more intertwined with domestic political opinions than before. In line with this, in several European countries, support for Russia and Vladimir Putin is stronger among the voter base of anti-establishment parties, i.e. the radical right and left.The Hungarian public's attitude towards Russia has also changed significantly since the regime change, with two important elements being polarisation and (especially in recent years) a related strengthening of favourable attitudes towards Russia on the right of the political spectrum. The geopolitical attitudes of the Hungarian public seem to have been in a constant state of flux in recent years, for reasons that can be identified in both foreign and domestic politics. Authoritarian regimes have traditionally been more successful in manipulating their image, which I have called "authoritarian inflation."

I have been working on the phenomenon of public discourse based on dichotomies and Manichean thinking and the populist or extremist mobilisation and organisations that build on it since 2009. In 2015, in an (often cited) study, I addressed the question of how the unresolved socio-political conflicts of the regime change and the political rhetoric based on them led to a radicalisation process in Hungarian society and politics, and how this legitimised strong institution-changing political aspirations. A similar question was addressed by Zsolt Enyedi and me in a paper we wrote together in 2018 in a leading political science journal. In 2017, I summarized my research on Hungarian populist and radical movements in a volume I wrote together with my colleague - this volume is also my habilitation thesis. This book explores how the supply and demand for extremism met in Hungary, i.e. how the growing demand for authoritarian, discriminatory, anti-systemic political rhetoric and solutions, which has been measurable in Hungary since 2002 and reflected in attitudes and values, led to the institutional strengthening of the political far right from 2009 onwards and the political mainstreaming of its ideology and aspirations. With other co-authors, we also addressed the question of how scapegoating rhetoric leads to local policy choices and mobilisation strategies. Other research conducted at the Department of Social Psychology at ELTE PPK, focusing specifically on political violence, has explored how political ideologies can legitimize violence against certain minority groups. In one study, we examined a similar relationship with homeless people.

Research into anti-scientific pseudoscience and conspiracy theories is a topic that has received undue attention, but is crucial for the future of science and the public perception of science and the policy programmes that build on it. From 2020 onwards, I will be investigating the social psychology of pseudoscientific beliefs through a Bolyai János research fellowship, using both survey and experimental methods.