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Fighting against injustice: Motivations of ally collective action

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Abstract

In my PhD dissertation I focused on motivations of ally collective action intentions on behalf of marginalized groups. I studied how cognitive and emotional aspects of injustice were connected to different forms of allyship, like prosocial behavior and political action. Affective injustice was identified as a basic motivation for ally collective action but I considered intergroup hostility and non-supportive social contexts as important barriers for action. Injustice appraisals of ingroup privilege and outgroup disadvantage and intergroup emotions of sorry and outrage were tested in their mobilization potential for prosocial intergroup behavior and classic forms of collective action (e.g. political participation). In the first part, I conducted two experiments (Study 1 and 2) and a survey (Study 3) on the effect of privilege versus disadvantage framings on collective action intention, to test whether privilege awareness motivated ally collective action toward marginalized groups, like the Roma or poor people. We found a backlash effect with the Roma outgroup because of high hostility toward the group, and found that only disadvantage framing, but not privilege framing had a connection to action intentions. This suggestested that participants were more willing to reconsider the outgroup's responsibility but not their own responsibility in intergroup injustice. In the second part, I conducted a series of survey studies (Study 4-6) and an experimental study (Study 7) to test if the intergroup emotion of sorry (that is a controversial emotion in terms of social change potential) can be a motivator of collective action toward marginalized groups, like the Roma and refugees. I found that sorry can be as strong, or even stronger predictor of action intention than outrage, but only toward groups who face economic disadvantages. In case of politically but not economically disadvantaged groups, sorry it not a relevant predictor. In the general discussion, I interpreted findings by reflecting on the role of intergoup and societal contexts in the specific predictors of ally behavior.

Keywords: ally collective action, injustice appraisal, intergroup emotion, privilege

„Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world; indeed, it's the only thing that ever has." (Margaret Mead)

Introduction to collective action research

In my PhD dissertation I investigate the motivations of ally collective action among advantaged group members, who are not activists. What makes advantaged group members care about grievances of a disadvantaged group? What makes them even eager to act on behalf of outgroups, who are marginalized in society and targets of high prejudice and hostility? Hundreds of volunteers who were not active before, assissted refugees stuck in railway stations in Hungary at the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015. When homeless people were criminalized by a new law in Hungary in 2018, only a few hundreds of people gathered to protest against it. What factors motivate privileged people to act on behalf of an outgroup and what prevent them from becoming allies? I studied how cognitive appraisals of injustice and intergroup emotions among advantaged group members predict collective action intentions on behalf of marginalized groups.

Collective action is any action that is taken in order to change the status of a group in society (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Originally, collective action research focused on the engagement of members of disadvantaged groups in efforts to change their disadvantaged situation (Wright & Lubensky, 2009). In contrast, ally collective action occurs when a majority group member acts on behalf of a disadvantaged outgroup related to perceived injustices suffered by members of the outgroup. Ally action can also be defined as any action that is conducted in political solidarity (Becker, 2012).

Ally action is not a side issue to the research of collective action. Pride movements or the Black Lives Matter movement are successful because they attract masses of supporters, not only from the disadvantaged group, but majority members too. #Metoo posts were shared not only by victims, but also by people who wanted to show solidarity with the victims. The „HeforShe" campaign explicitly calls on men to be allies in the fight for gender equality. Allies from privileged groups are important for multiple reasons: they increase the support base of the movement and possess resources and power in society that they can mobilize for social change. Social change occurs

when the status hierarchy between advantaged and disadvantaged groups is challenged, that can be most efficiently realized when members of the minority and the majority unite in putting pressure on the authority to change the status quo and implement structural changes in policies and institutions (Subasic, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). Such changes can take place in the support of policies in favour of disadvantaged groups (for example desegregation or integration of minorities), introducing legal changes or new measures to prevent discrimination and protect human rights.

The studies presented in this dissertation therefore aim to answer the question what motivates ally collective action in different intergroup contexts. In the introduction, I will distinguish collective action initiated by disadvantaged groups and collective action by allies and introduce how classic theories of collective action define the most important predictors of action. I also describe different forms of collective action, and how they are categorized and assessed in terms of their contribution to social change. I put a special emphasis on cognitive (e.g. injustice appraisals) and emotional aspects of mobilization. I investigate a range of emotions in their role in collective action. Then, I list the possible barriers of mobilization for collective action: why people tend to engage in individual strategies compared to collective one's when facing injustice and how positive intergroup relations can undermine the recognition of unjust intergroup status relations. I describe the privilege of the majority as a possible source of allyship, but also as a possible threat to the social identity of the majority, therefore a hurdle of allyship. I discuss the role of open and subtle forms of prejudice among the majority in behavioral intentions, and how non-supportive contexts can decrease the willingness to act on behalf of outgroups.

Motivators of collective action engagement

The motivations to engage in ally action is similar to ingroup collective action or other forms of social mobilization. Ally action come about when majority members collaborate with members of a minority by sharing their perception of grievances and moral values, and they fight for the restoration of these values, such as egalitarianism and equal treatment of minorities or disadvantaged groups (Subasic & Reynolds, 2008). Therefore, political participation is not dependent on membership in a disadvantaged group. Shared views about a public issue, and consequently an opinion-based identity is sufficient to mobilize for social change (McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009). An opinion-based identity means that people can develop a common identity based on a

common stand in an issue, irrespectively from the social groups they belong to or the advantaged or disadvantaged status they have in society.

People can mobilize for a number of reasons that we can categorize as incidental and structural causes. Incidental causes are newly emerging problems, for example a government measure that threatens the interests of a group in society. In contrast, structural causes are long-lasting, deep-rooted problems in society, for example the marginalization and low status of specific minorities. The mobilization of non-activist people (lay people who do not have an activist identity) for collective action is easier for an incidental cause (compared to a structural one) that makes a specific issue salient and where people unite to express their resistance to an undesireable change. For example, one of the biggest demonstrations in Hungary in recent years was the protests against the internet tax in 2014, a measure that the government planned to introduce and that brought thousands of citizens to the street to express their opposition. This incidental cause became salient in the media very quickly and it created a consensus and a common opinion-based identity ("*We are against this measure together."*) that was a good basis for mobilization for lay people, irrespectively of age, political ideology or social status.

In contrast, structural problems are less salient for the advantaged people in society, as they are not personally involved in these disadvantages, and they do not necessarily recognize their role and responsibility in their solution as possible allies. Activists often come from disadvantaged groups who experience these structural problems first hand, and this experience motivates them to act against these problems (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). At the same time, advantaged and disadvantaged identities often intersect that is also a strong basis for mobilization (Curtin, Kende & Kende, 2016). Those who are not members of disadvantaged groups, can also show solidarity with these groups based on their moral convictions: their belief that supporting these disadvantaged groups is the morally appropriate behavior as a response to a structrural or incidental cause (van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears & Bettache, 2011).

The social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) highlights the psychological mechanism behind collective action taken by non-activists (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). The model highlights that mobilization for a cause is not really dependent on the magnitude or severity of a problem, but much more on the subjective psychological mechanisms that motivates action. Relative deprivation theory,

an important antecedent of SIMCA states that it is not the objective, but the relatively perceived status that influences people's contentment or resentment in society (Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012).

SIMCA highlights three key elements as motivators of action: affective injustice, politicized social identity and efficacy. Affective injustice means that people engage in collective action based on injustice appraisals and related emotions (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Injustice awareness implies that the situation of the disadvantaged group is compared to the situation of the advantaged group, and status differences are perceived as illegitimate (Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). In other words, group members recognize a common grievance they share in society with fellow group members and it makes them angry. The more injustice awareness is related to fueling emotions like anger and outrage, the more likely it would lead to collective action engagement. Social identity becomes politicized, when people realize that as members of a group they are part of a power struggle in society. In this struggle, their group is treated unfairly by a higher status group, and they accept the fight for social change for the benefit of their group (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). Group membership is not necessarily derived from a minority or activist identity, a shared opinion-based identity related to a relevant issue can also be the basis of mobilization (McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009). The srength of social identification increases willingness for collective action engagement that can take place not only offline but also on online platforms (Kende, van Zomeren, Ujhelyi, & Lantos, 2016).

However, injustice awareness and outrage are often not sufficient sources of mobilization. Engagement is more likely to occur when change is possible, and people feel that they can achieve it. Belief in change, or with other words, efficacy belief is a crucial element of the social identity model of collective action that was built on the original conceptualization of how people coping with negative social identity can engage in social change efforts (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Efficacy perceptions increase when the status quo is not only perceived as illegitimate, but also unstable, and "cognitive alternatives" become accessable (Tajfel, 1978). This leads to the anticipation that social change is possible (Zhang, Jetten, Iyer, & Cui, 2013). Therefore, awareness about injustices increases engagement in collective action only in the presence of high perceived efficacy. People are more motivated to question the status quo if they see the possibility of change (Stewart, Latu & Branscombe, 2012). In the absence of efficacy beliefs (i.e., when there is no hope for change) people tend to justify intergroup

situations. However, system justifying tendencies are not only related to efficacy perceptions, but a number of other variables as well (such as political orientation, need for cognitive closure or threat perceptions,see Jost & Hunyady, 2005), but system justification was also directly connected to a decrease of system challenging collective action intentions (Jost & Becker, Osborne, & Badaan, 2017).

Different forms of collective action

Collective action encompasses many different forms of behavior. The classic understanding of collective action refers to activism in the form of political protests, such as signing petitions or participating in street demonstrations. However, intergroup helping, volunteerism, and donation can also be regarded as forms of collective actions as they reflect an intention to improve the situation of an entire group (Thomas, Rathmann, & McGarty, 2017). At the same time, these forms of engagements can be criticized that they do not directly strive for social change in the sense that most political actions do. Based on their social change potential, forms of collective actions can be categorized as benevolent versus activist support (Thomas & McGarty, 2017), or promoting first order change versus second order change (Russell & Bohan, 2016). Using these categorizations, classic forms of collective action, like participation in demonstrations that directly challenge the status quo would belong to the first category, while intergroup helping would belong to the latter (Kende, 2016).

However, we can question whether this strict distinction is correct in its implication that intergroup helping always lacks genuine social change potential. Acts of intergroup helping can take place with a direct motivation to change status relations, or they may simply be driven to alleviate the difficulties of the disadvantaged without challenging the status quo (Penner, 2004). The theory of intergroup helping as status relations even suggests that high status groups can strategically use helping to conserve existing intergroup relations, especially when the status of the advantaged group is threatened (Nadler, 2002). Yet, helping is not necessarily strategic: we can talk about non-strategic helping, where the action is the indicator of pro-sociality and altruism (van Leeuwen, 2017). For example, generosity toward the group is connected to different types of action, like volunteerism and helping (Collett & Morrissey, 2007).

Furthermore, the distinction is even less straightforward if we take into account that these two forms of intergroup behaviors coexist: those who are involved in activist type of support, are usually also active in benevolent support (Thomas & McGarty,

2016). A study about the motivations of refugee helpers in Hungary at the peak of refugee crisis in 2015 revealed that political action and volunteerism are closely connected. Though offering services and giving donations to the refugees at realway stations seemed to be examples of intergroup helping but political action, still, in the normative context where authorities treated refugees in a hostile and passive way, such acts became a politicized, dissent behavior. Our results demonstrated that direct political stand for the refugees (e.g. participating in pro-refugee demonstration) and offering aid to them had a shared motivational background, specifically the same moral convictions predicted both types of pro-social behaviors (Kende, Lantos, Belinszky, Csaba, & Lukács, 2017). These results suggest that both types of actions, activist and benevolent type of support are important tools of an ally, therefore the relevance of helping and donation should not be underestimated in specific circumstances.

Mobilizing emotions

People engage in ally collective action based on injustice appraisals and related emotions (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Injustice awareness implies that the situation of the disadvantaged group is compared to the situation of the advantaged group, and status differences are perceived as illegitimate (Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). Injustice awareness is a precondition to engagement of collective action, therefore attitudes that blurs this awareness, such as open or subtle form of prejudice (e.g. modern racism, McConahay,1983) is an obstacle for ally action intentions on behalf of the disadvantaged (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009, Fingerhut, 2011).

Intergroup emotion theory (IET) builds on the appraisal theories of emotion, stating that appraisals, emotions and actions are means of coping with events in intergroup contexts (Halperin, 2014; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001; Smith 1993). Intergroup emotions have a regulatory function of intergroup behavior, that is, action tendencies are assumed to be mediated by the experience of a specific emotion (Halperin, 2014; Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004, Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009).

Intergroup emotions can be distinguished based on their direction of focus, therefore we can talk about system-focused, self-focused and other-focused emotions (Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011). Political action is generally motivated by system-focused emotions such as outrage or anger (Montada & Schneider, 1989; Thomas, Smith, McGarty, & Postmes, 2010), as emotions related to the perception of group-

based injustice (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Similarly to anger, outrage is also a well-documented politicized emotion as a result of perceived griavences in society, and consequently a strong drive for collective action (Haidt, 2003; Leach et al., 2002; Thomas & McGarty, 2009). Although, only anger and outrage are considered in prominent models of collective action (like the SIMCA, van Zomeren et al., 2008; Becker & Tausch, 2015), there is evidence that there are other moral emotions in response to injustice that can be potential predictors of ally action. These are self-focused emotions of guilt and anger, and other-focused emotions such as pity, sympathy, and empathy.

There are controversial findings on the role of guilt in collective action. In an experiment, perspective taking on behalf of outgroups (sexual minorities and Blacks) increased collective action intention by the mediation of guilt, but not self-focused anger or other-focused sympathy (Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair & Swim, 2008). In contrast, other studies found that self-focused anger was a stronger predictor of collective action intention, compared to guilt in a hostile intergroup context, by Australians on behalf of Aboriginals (Leach, Iyer, Pedersen, 2006). However, guilt was found to be a useful emotion in motivating policy support to compensate for past harmdoing, but it did not raise support of social change- oriented policies (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003). Sympathy, an other-focused emotion seemed to be more relevant in both compensatory and equal- opportunity promoting intentions (Iyer et al, 2003; Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008).

Pity, sympathy, and empathy (or alternatively: compassion, Lazarus, 1991) are all other-focused prosocial emotions that people experience when they witness the suffering of others (Wispé, 1986). Prosocial emotion emerges when the perceiver faces an incongruency between the situation (e.g., suffering) and one's own needs or values (Dijker, 2001). It is therefore connected to an increased arousal that people aim to reduce by helping to alleviate the suffering.

Although these emotions are all prosocial emotions in reaction to a person's or group's suffering, there are some controversies about their role in mobilization, as they are considered either to lead to avoidance, or to helping, but not to collective action intention in some cases, while in other cases, they were even to related to collective action intentions.

Both sympathy and outrage were characterized as responses to injustice, but sympathy was related to less injustice awareness, ingroup responsibility and less

collective action intentions (Montada & Schneider, 1989). Outrage, as opposed to sympathy, was found to lead to genuine (i.e., social change oriented) collective action engagement (Thomas et al., 2009). Furthermore, "giving" type of collective action (e.g. donation) was more related to sympathy, whereas activist type of action was more related to outrage among advantaged group members (Thomas & McGarty, 2017). Namely, intergroup helping and volunteerism is typically connected to prosocial emotions, while political action is related to anger and outrage. In line with the theory of intergroup helping as power relations, suggesting that high status groups can strategically use helping to conserve existing intergroup relations (Nadler, 2002), some even found that prosocial emotions prevent advantaged group members from engaging in social-change oriented action. For example, high levels of sympathy for the suffering of people in developing nations did not lead to political action on behalf of them (Schmitt, Behner, Montada, Müller, & Müller-Fohrbrodt, 2000).

Pity is an even more controversial emotion that can elicit two behaviors: taking no action, or taking action with the aim of reducing the suffering of a group. The stereotype-content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, Xu, 2002) suggests that people feel pity on the basis of paternalistic attitudes about outgroups high on the warmth, but low on the competence dimension, and can engage in intergroup helping, depending on the specific intergroup situation (Cuddy et al., 2007). However, pity has not been connected to collective action intentions before.

At the same time, the co-occurrence of prosocial emotions and outrage is a stronger predictor of collective action than prosocial emotions or outrage alone (Fernando, Kashima, & Laham, 2014). Empathy (Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003) and sympathy (Leach et al., 2002; Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2015), standing together with anger, have been identified as important predictors of intergroup helping and collective action by the advantaged. It was also suggested that empathy and anger motivate collective action in a sequential process: the prosocial emotion (in this study: empathy) facilitated outrage on behalf of the disadvantaged, and outrage was a more proximal predictor of ally collective action (Selvanathan, Techakesari, Tropp, & Barlow, 2017).

In sum, previous research highlighted two types of outcomes related to the role of prosocial emotions compared to outrage in collective action: (1) prosocial emotions motivate collective action engagement less than outrage, (2) prosocial emotions can contribute to mobilization in interaction with outrage. Based on this, prosocial

emotions (i.e., feeling sorry) do not play a central role in political mobilization. However, we investigate that in some intergroup contexts, where economic and political disadvantages, and also the need for material helping and political action co-exist, feeling sorry can have a distinguished role in mobilization for collective action.

Barriers of collective action

The road to hell is paved with good intentions: the demobilizing effect of contact. Research in social psychology dealt with ways of social change throughout its history, as popular topics revolved around societal problems, such as prejudice and inequality, and questions about how they could be decreased to create a more just society. Research conducted following the Second World War into the age of the Civil Rights Movement focused on reducing the problem, and social change was expected from decreasing biased attitudes (i.e. prejudice) and behavior (i. e. discrimination) among members of the majority (Wright, & Lubensky, 2009). Intergroup contact, already outlined in the seminal work of Allport (1954), has been confirmed by evidence as an efficient tool to achieve this goal. Metaanalyses highlighted the effect of contact in decreasing prejudice among majority group members (Pettigrew, &Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew, &Tropp, 2008; Tropp & Prenovost, 2008). These findings had a great impact on policies and interventions striving for social change especially in Western democracies. For example, Allport's work was an important reference for those arguing for desegregation policies in education in the United States (Pettigrew, 1961).

However, it was questioned whether intergroup contact and harmony can lead to genuine social change from a minority perspective. The research on prejudice reduction focused mainly on majority participants, while collective action research focused on minorities, so these viewpoints did not cross each other for a while (Wright & Baray, 2012). However, a shift from investigating attitudes to investigating action tendencies revealed the problem that positive intergroup contact has a demobilizing effect on the collective action intentions among minorities.

Correlational studies demonstrated that positive intergroup contact induces positive attitudes toward the majority, but at the same time, it reduces the likeliness that the minority stands up for their rights in society (Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010). For example, in case of a positive interpersonal experience, members of the low status group are likely to overestimate the high power group's tendency to act fairly in a resource allocation task toward them (Saguy, et al., 2009), and therefore their

motivation to confront them would be reduced. This "demobilizing effect" comes from the fact that perceived discrimination of the ingroup decreases when minority members experience that intergroup relations are positive (Selvanathan, Techakesari, Tropp, & Barlow, 2017). This has been named the "sedative effect" (Cakal, Hewstone, Schwär, & Heath, 2011) or referred to as the "irony of harmony" (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). The phenomenon has been demonstrated in experimental studies as well (see. e. g. Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008; Saguy & Chernyak-Hai, 2012).

These findings highlight that we need to distinguish between intergroup attitudes and intergroup power relations. It is possible that intergroup attitudes are positive, but the power relations remain unequal and unjust. For example, benevolent sexism (endorsing the stereotype of women as they are warm but not competent, see e.g. Glick & Fiske, 1996) functions as an ideology that ensures harmony and positive attitudes between men and women and at the same time it maintains the status quo by veiling power asymmetries between groups (Jackman, 1994). Nonetheless, the importance of seeking positive contact and harmony in intergroup relations should not be underestimated, as social cohesion by the mean of prejudice reduction is also a form of social change, but not the only one. Collective action is a more confrontative way of addressing social change by the means of political action, that is more based on outrage and anger than empathy and sympathy (Wright & Lubensky, 2009).

In summary, changing power relations by focusing only on harmony and attitude change may not be sufficient to achieve extensive social change, in fact, in some cases, it may even contribute to maintaining the social hierarchies. In contrast, a double focus on both intergroup relations and tendencies to engage in collective action may be a more sufficient tool to address structural and political changes in society that necessarily contains awareness of injustices and often entails direct confrontations. At the same time, such confrontation can lead to resistance among the advantaged, especially in hostile intergroup contexts.

The lesson learned from the demobilization effect was that status relations need to be highlighted and challenged when groups meet. A decrease in perceived discrimination is an important element of the demobilization effect (Dixon, Durrheim, Tredoux, Tropp, Clack & Eaton, 2010). In an experiment messages conveyed by advantaged group members were manipulated within a positive intergroup contact situation with the disadvantaged (Becker, Wright, Lubensky, & Zhou, 2013). They found the demobilization effect of positive contact among the disadvantaged group

when advantaged members explicitly downplayed intergroup injustice (by commenting on the fairness of their advantages), or when they stayed silent about injustice. In contrast, disadvantaged members did not experience demobilization by the positive contact when advantage members explicitly questioned intergroup injustice. This study demonstrated an important message to majority members as possible allies: the recommendation based on these studies was „Don't be just a friend, be a just friend" (Becker et al., 2013, p.452), referring to the importance of injustice awareness in allyship.

In contrast to the demobilization effect on members of disadvantaged group members, positive contact with minorities has an overall positive effect on majority members both in terms of attitude change and in terms of collective action intentions (Hässler, et al., accepted manuscript in Nature Human Behavior, 2019). This effect is mediated by the increased perception of discrimination concerning minorities: by being exposed to the negative experiences of minorities, social comparison makes it possible to recognize the relatively better status and privileges of members of advantaged groups (Reimer, Becker, Benz, Christ, Dhont, Klocke, & Hewstone, 2017). Furthermore, increased empathy toward another group is also connected to the willingness to act on behalf of a disadvantaged group which is also an outcome of intergroup contact (Selvanathan et al., 2017).

In sum, positive contact between groups has many positive consequences for intergroup relations, but because of the illusion of harmony it can create, it stops disadvantaged groups from mobilizing for collective action, especially when mobilization is against members of the advantaged group participating in the positive contact experience. However, the recognition, acknowledgement and open communication about unjust intergroup status relations can counter the demobilization effect. Advantaged group members have great responsibility in dealing with these issues, as potential allies, but their privileged position in society could paradoxically make them blind for their role in social change.

Privilege awaresness as a double-edged sword: Motivator or threat?

Privilege means certain advantages that majority members possess in society merely based on their group membership (McIntosh, 1988). Privilege is an expression that involves the positive consequences of belonging to a high status group in different fields of life, including everyday interactions and participation in public life (e.g. at work,

education, public institutions etc.). Privilege is usually invisible to members of the groups that hold it (McIntosh, 2010). One of the reasons is that majority identity is not salient to majority members, therefore downward comparisons toward minorities that could highlight their relatively better status is not common (Leach, et al., 2002). Furthermore, the fact that they possess unearned advantages and have the responsibility in maintaining unjust status relations threatens the positive identity of the group. As a response to threat, the majority tend to deny privilege, as it maintains the status quo while also protecting the group's moral image. The denial of injustice can be considered a strategic response by the advantaged that minimizes the differences between the groups to uphold their positive moral stand (Leach et al, 2002). For example, members of advantaged groups are more willing to downplay the intergroup conflict than to acknowledge it, in contrast to members of minorities whose interest is just the opposite, they highlight their grievances (Livingstone, Sweetman, Bracht, & Haslam, 2015).

At the same time, the acknowledgement of privilege has positive influence on both attitudes toward outgroups and collective action on behalf of them among majority members. Privilege awareness means that one has new insights about unjust intergroup relations, and sees their ingroup's responsibility in changing the status quo. Therefore this awareness correlates with collective action intentions. In a correlational study, heterosexual privilege awareness was related to the engagement of LGBT activism (Montgomery & Stewart, 2012). Furthermore, experimental studies demonstrated that raising awareness about privilege decreases modern sexism (Case et al, 2014) and modern racism (Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt 2005).

However, privilege awareness can also lead to strategic responses to maintain the status quo, if it is threatening to the ingroup. The theory of intergroup helping as power relations suggests that high status groups can strategically use helping to conserve existing intergroup relations (Nadler, 2002). In case of high perceived threat, advantaged group members are more likely to offer dependency-oriented help to the disadvantaged (i.e., offer solutions rather than the tools of solving problem that keeps the help recipient in further need of help), so the status difference between groups is maintained (Nadler, Harpaz-Gorodeisky, & Ben-David, 2009). When majority participants see no threat to their social status in the form of social change, they are more likely to offer autonomy-oriented helping (i.e., the tools of solving problems rather than final answers). The same distinction can be made about different forms of collective action: perceived threat increased preference for charity type of action

compared to empowerment of the outgroup (Shnabel, Dovidio, & Levin, 2017). Consequently, if the focus on privilege is a threat to majority members, it can be counterproductive for action intentions, as confronting people about a possibly unjustly received (i.e., unearned) advantage in society threatens their social identity, therefore more defensive and motivated to justify inequality (Lowery, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2008).

Confrontation with privilege could be especially risky and cause backlash effects when prejudice and denial of disadvantage is high (Powell et al., 2005). For example, when Israeli Jews were confronted with structural disadvantages and discrimination Palestinians had to face, they reacted with decreased support for empowering policies for Palestinian people in a lab experiment, in contrast to a framing that did not threaten ingroup privilege by referring to the need for structural change (Shnabel, et al, 2016).

In a previous research, we tested the effect of privilege versus disadvantage framing of intergroup status differences on collective action in a gender context. We expected that highlighting male privilege would increase collective action intentions among women and cause a backlash among men in a Hungarian context, where egalitarian and feminist discources appeared in the mainstream media in only recent years, and where there is even stronger resistance to feminist ideas (which pose a general threat to the status quo, see Kovacs & Hevesi, 2015) than in Western democracies. Our findings showed that in contrast to our expectation, there was a general backlash effect of confrontation with male privilege on both gender. It was not only that collective action intentions did not increase, but participants' hostile sexism even increased in the treatment condition, compared to the control condition (Lantos, Nagy, & Kende, 2017). These results demonstrated that findings in Western contexts are not necessarily applicable to other contexts with less egalitarian societal norms.

Open and subtle prejudice and collective action. Gaining the support of members of the majority for a cause of the disadvantaged can be problematic for reasons of cognitive biases and motivated processes. Most importantly, advantaged group members usually have a biased perception of disadvantaged groups (Sidanius, Devereux, & Pratto, 1992). Such a biased perception can take place in the form of explicit prejudice toward the outgroup consisting of negative stereotypes and attribution errors, and it can take place in more subtle forms of prejudice, such as denying the disadvantages of the outgroup (Sidanius et. al, 1992). It depends on the context, whether

open or subtle prejudice expression is the more common and acceptable (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002; Kende & McGarty, 2018).

Positive attitudes toward the outgroup are essential in the involvement in ally action on behalf of the disadvantaged. In previous research, ally collective action intentions were associated with low levels of prejudice toward the outgroup (Fingerhut, 2011), positive contact with the disadvantaged and positive outgroup attitudes (Reimer et al, 2017). The contact effect was mediated by perceived threat: lower threat predicted more positive intergroup attitudes and ally action intention among the advantaged group (Cakal, Hewstone, Güler, & Heath, 2016). Therefore, the larger the social distance is between a majority and a minority, the less likely it is that members of the majority would feel solidarity with the outgroup. Furthermore, in a hostile intergroup context, negative contact might be a more salient experience than positive contact, therefore contact has neither the effect on prejudice- reduction, nor the effect on mobilization among the majority (Kende et al, 2017).

Lack of explicit prejudice is not the only precondition of ally action, but the lack of subtle forms of bias, such as modern prejudice as well. The term modern racism was originally coined by McConahay (1983) to describe the persistence of racial segregation despite the decrease in the level of racism in surveys. Modern racism was a response to the changing social context that prohibited the open expression of hostility in Western democracies. As a result, it encompasses the denial of discrimination and antagonism toward the political demands of the disadvantaged group by opposition to affirmative action policies (Sears, 1988, Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). In sum, modern racism is an obstacle for prosocial action intentions on behalf of the disadvantaged as it blurs injustice awareness (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009) that is a precondition to engagement in collective action.

Activist groups who strive for social change to decrease unjust status differences in society are usually targets of prejudice by the majority, especially by the fact that activists often come from disadvantaged minorities which makes them a double minority in the eye of majority group members (who are perceived as not only different from them, but also active in advocating their cause, by that they challenge the prevailing social order). A model based on the type of stigma concerning target groups of prejudice, minorities can be perceived by the the majority as inferior (derogated), threatening (dangerous) or both (dissident groups), and protestors and those who are

critical with authorities typically belong to the dissident category (Duckett & Sibley, 2007). However, social change comes about when the minority is successful in gaining support of more and more allies from the majority to their cause to change norms and public opinion and challenge the authority together (Subasic et al., 2008). An ally is not necessarily an activist, but someone who can identify with the cause of the minority and expresses his/her support toward this cause. This support can have different levels and forms which also depends on the phase of ally identity development.

The ups and downs of ally identity development. Participation in ally collective action is a rare phenomenon in general: mobilization is a result of a long way of identity development among advantaged group members. Based on the hurdles that were described above, such as privilege and open and subtle forms of prejudice toward the outgroup, this process takes time, dedication and effort of advantaged group members.

Tatum (1992) summarizes the main sources of resistence in White students who participated in courses about racism. Firstly, talking about race and prejudice is still a taboo in society, that is uncomfortable to talk about, especially for advantaged group members. This is in line with studies demonstrating that advantaged group members are more motivated to focus on the commonalities between them and the disadvantaged group, than the power asymmetry between the groups (Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008). Secondly, students were socialized to endorse meritocratic views, and the belief of living in a just society where everyone gets what one deserves. Such system legitimizing beliefs in advantaged group members are connected to the denial of racism (Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998). Thirdly, even if someone is open to deal with racism as a phenomenon, it is simply hard to reflect on one's own prejudice and racism, as it threatens positive self-image.

The model of White racial identity development (Helms, 1990) describes the six stages how an average member of the advantaged group can become an ally of a disadvantaged group. In this process, one has to leave racism behind and develop a new non-rascist White identity. In the first stage named Contact, one has no awareness of privilege, and does not question the widespread stereotypes of minorities. The Disintegration phase happens when someone start to recognize injustices and racism through specific experiences or insights, but this raises discomforting feelings in someone, such as guilt or shame. These emotions in turn leads to withdrawal or denial

of the problem. The Reintegration phase means that someone tries to get back to the original state when he/she did not face the problem of racism, and may even feel anger toward the minorities because of one'S own frustration over the problem that can not be denied anymore. Those who are not stuck in this phase, may start to explore the topic of racism more, and try to ask for guidance from minority members, which is called Pseudo-Independence phase. The next phase, Immersion means that someone starts to get rid of stereotypical views and becomes able to work out a new, non-rascist White identity. The last phase, Autonomy is reached when this new White identity is strong enough to motivate the advantaged group member to express anti-racism in everyday life and when someone is ready to join to the movements of disadvantaged groups as an ally. However, the process is not necessarily linear, there could be shifts between the different phases, and one could be stuck at a specific phase.

Interventions that aim to raise awareness among the advantaged group members can be efficient only if people can honestly deal with the difficulties and frustration in this process to get over their own resistance. These interventions should raise responsibility and efficacy among the advantaged group and empower them to recognize that they can be agents of change (Tatum, 1992). However, when such an intervention is not reinforced by societal norms, but takes place within a hostile societal context, interventions involving confrontation have a risk to lead to unwanted effects such as a backlash that occurs in the form of higher prejudice and denial of intergroup status differences.

Non-supportive social contexts. Prejudice itself is context-dependent and social norms affect intergroup attitudes and the way they are expressed (Crandall, et al, 2002). Some social contexts encourage solidarity more than others, for example by emphasizing egalitarian norms and the norm of nonprejudice with disadvantaged people. These contexts are typically Western countries with a long democratic tradition and with a history of successful civil right movements where the protection of human rights and equal opportunities are central values. These norms are communicated in the legal system, in school curricula, and reinforced by political decisions and policies. In these contexts, ally behavior is socially accepted, and people who engage in ally collective action can expect social support rather than punishments; and their action is motivated by political efficacy (Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2015). However, in social contexts in which the norm of egaliatrianism or nonprejudice is weaker, such as

in the case of Eastern European countries, being nonprejudiced toward some outgroups, such as Roma people, can be viewed as a dissident opinion (Kende, Hadarics, & Lášticová, 2017). Therefore, engagement in ally action may be frawned upon, or viewed with suspicion.

It is important to note that the difference between Western and Eastern societies was larger until recent years: by the rise of populism and and questioning norms of "political correctness", it seems that a backlash occurred in societies, exactly as a reaction to the once predominant progressive value change (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Still, the different history of Western and non-Western democracies makes it a valid question to ask, in what ways these contexts influence prejudice and collective action orientation. Considering that most social psychological studies on collective action tendencies were conducted in Western contexts with a longer tradition of supportive social norms (see e.g. Calcagno, 2016; Drury & Kaiser, 2014; Mallet, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008; Reason, Roosa Millar, & Scales, 2005; Selvanathan, Techakesari, Tropp, & Barlow, 2017), we know little about the motivations to engage in ally collective action in less supportive (non-Western) contexts, where discourses on anti-racism and solidarity were never that dominant.

Institutions of democracy as well as democratic norms and values are fragile and weak in post-communist countries three decades after the fall of communism. People in these countries tend to be more prejudiced than members of Western European societies according to international comparative surveys. For instance, the European Social Survey comparing 16 European countries demonstrated that ethnic prejudice was the highest in Hungary toward Jews, Muslims and the Roma (Gerő, Messzing & Ságvári, 2015). Furthermore it was also demonstrated that in these highly prejudiced contexts, education could not function as a moderator of prejudice, as it did in Western European countries, which meant that those with higher education level had a lower level of prejudice toward outgroups (Zick, Pettigrew, & Wagner, 2008). Studies based on European Social Survey data confirm that specific ideologies connected to prejudice, such as authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and the rejection of diversity, are higher in Hungary than in Western European democracies, and consequently rejection of outgroups in general (as it is conceptualized in group-focused emnity, Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011) is also higher.

The picture is also rather negative when we look at political participation in Eastern Europe. Both formal (e.g. voting) and informal (e.g. demonstration) means of

political activism are lower compared to Western democracies, especially among the youth (Wallace & Kovacheva, 1998; Robertson, 2009). Political activism and political interest among young people had been low in Hungary in the first two decades after the transition (Örkény, 2000; Gazsó and Szabó, 2002; Szabó, 2009). This tendency has recently changed with a growing participation in new forms of action, such as demonstrations and online activism (Lantos & Kende, 2015; Oross, 2016). However, the problem reaches beyond young people's disinterest in politics, the majority of the population does not trust political institutions and does not believe that they can influence politics. These beliefs lead to low overall interest in politics and low political participation (TARKI, 2013; Szabó & Gerő, 2015.). When attempting to understand psychological mechanisms of ally collective engagement by relying on samples from Eastern Europe, these characterstics need to be taken into account.

The structure of the dissertation

In my doctoral thesis I investigate the motivations of ally collective action toward marginalized groups in non-supportive contexts. My special focus is how different cognitive appraisals and intergroup emotions predict ally collective action on behalf of disadvantaged groups. I distinguish different forms of allyship (e.g. prosocial action/ intergroup helping and collective action) and their specific predictors. I test, how specific intergroup contexts (with different levels of hostility and type of disadvantage) influence the predictors of allyship, and I interpret these findings by reflecting on the role of the societal context in Hungary.

The social identity model of collective action emphasizes three main factors out of which I mainly concentrate on affective injustice in my thesis, but also reflect on the role of social identity and efficacy in each study. In the first place, I investigate two aspects: (1) how different cognitive framings of intergroup injustice influence different forms of collective action (2) how injustice-related intergroup emotions shape different forms of collective action.

In the first part of my dissertation, I study how different injustice appraisals influence ally collective action intentions on behalf of different disadvantaged groups. For this goal, I used an experimental paradigm contrasting privilege versus disadvantage focus (in other words, self-focus versus other-focus) in a new intergroup and societal context. In the original study, in a supportive Western context, privilege focus raised guilt and decreased modern racism compared to the disadvantage-focus,

which demonstrated that the confrontation with privilege and its self-focus made participants open to have new insights about the unjust intergroup status relations (Powell, Branscombe, & Smith, 2005). As this recognition is the basis of mobilization for collective action, I expected that findings of the original study can be extended to collective action intentions, therefore I worked with the hypothesis that privilege awareness is a motivator of collective action. However, as privilege awareness can be threatening to advantaged group members, it can also lead to a backlash effect among participants, namely a demobilization effect. Therefore, I also raised some concerns, whether the original findings can be applied to a more hostile intergroup context (toward the Roma in Hungary), in a more hostile societal context (where egalitarian norms are not emphasized and ally collective action might not be perceived as normative). Yet, as normative contexts are changeable, it is important to note that the US was a more egalitarian and supportive context for diversity at the time when the original study was conducted, as there are studies demonstrating that hostile political rhetoric of the Trump era has a measurable effect on the acceptability of prejudice expression directly after the US elections (Crandall, Miller, & White, 2018).

In Study 1, I tested if the manipulations function similarly to the original study among majority members in connection with Roma people in Hungary. We used a university sample (N =132) and tested two types of privilege and disadvantage manipulation. We confronted participants with a list of examples of either ingroup privilege or outgroup disadvantage in one case, and asked participant to generate examples for privilege and disadvantage in the other. We expected that privilege conditions raised higher privilege awareness and guilt, while disadvantage awareness raised higher sympathy. We did not measure behavioral intentions, as we wanted to use the first study as a pilot, to find out if manipulations work, or cause resistance among participants. We found no effects of either of the manipulations because of the high hostility toward the Roma group. Furthermore, some participants even reacted with backlash: they became emotional, criticized the study and expressed open prejudice toward the Roma.

To avoid resistance, in Study 2, we offered participants to choose an outgroup that they perceive as unjustly disadvantaged, or toward that they feel unjustly privileged. Possible outgroups were poor people, poorly educated people, village inhabitants, and the Roma. Then, we asked participant to think of these groups and generate examples of either outgroup disadvantage or ingroup privilege, and we also

added a control group who only chose an outgroup but did not generate examples of their disadvantage. Again, we used a university sample (N = 169).

We expected that privilege condition would decrease modern prejudice, increase guilt, ingroup responsibility and collective action intention, while disadvantage condition would increase sympathy and helping intention compared to the control condition. We also expexted that both treatment conditions decrease outgroup responsibility.

When we considered the effect of group choice, we found higher hostility toward the Roma than toward other outgroups. We also found a backlash effect: participants were less willing to help Roma compared to the control condition. Our hypotheses were not supported, the only effect we found was that disadvantage condition decreased perceived responsibility of the outgroup compared to the control condition. As we did not get the expected results, we speculated on the different interpretation of privilege in Western versus Eastern European contexts and raised the concern that privilege is a less known and accepted concept in Hungary than in the United States, where it is more part of the everyday and public discourse. We did not have a chance to make an international comparison, but we could analyse Hungarian survey data with a representative sample (N = 1007) to test the connection between privilege versus disadvantage awareness and behavioral intentions, like donation and collective action intention. Our assumption that disadvantage awareness had a stronger connection to behavioral intentions than privilege awareness, was supported. This confirmed that privilege was a marginal concept for participants, and not an important predictor for collective action.

In the second part, I turned from appraisals to intergroup emotions, and tested if sorry, that is, a prosocial emotion usually criticized as a system-maintaining, and not a system-challenging emotion, motivates collective action intention on behalf of marginalized outgroups. I compared the role of sorry to outrage (that is a classic mobilizing emotion) in motivating collective action and expected that sorry has a special relevance when it comes to marginalized groups who face not only political, but also economic disadvantage.

In Study 4, I used the same survey data as in Study 3, and tested the connection between injustice awareness, emotions and collective action intentions of majority people on behalf of the Roma in Hungary and built a path model to test my assumptions (N =1007). Our findings supported our hypothesis that sorry was a stronger predictor of

collective action compared to outrage in case of a marginalized outgroup, the Roma. In Study 5, we conducted the same analysis in connection with refugees as a target group, both in a representative sample in Hungary (N = 556) and a convenience sample in Germany (N = 191). In Study 6, we tested whether the role of sorry in collective action intention decreases in connection with a not economically, but politically disadvantaged outgroup, gay people, on a university sample (N = 475). Our results supported our expectation that outrage was a stronger predictor this time, than sorry.

To replicate the pattern that was found with different outgroups in cross-sectional data, we designed an experiment in Study 7 to test the role of sorry toward an economically versus a politically disadvantaged outgroup in a university sample. (N = 603). We used a fictitious scenario, where outgroups only differed in the type of disadvantage they faced: economic and political disadvantage versus only political disadvantage). We found that in case of economically disadvantaged groups, sorry is a strong motivator for collective action and donation, but when it comes to disadvantaged groups that are not economically deprived, sorry is a much weaker predictor than outrage.

Finally, I draw conclusions on cognitive and emotional predictors of ally collective action on behalf of marginalized groups, and also reflect on the limitations of this work and future directions.

Injustice (privilege and disadvantage) framings and allyship in hostile intergroup contexts

Privilege, as motivator or obstacle of ally action

„*Dear everyone who isn't a middle or upper class white boy, I'm sorry. I have started life on the top of the ladder while you were born on the first rung. I say now that I would change places with you in an instant, but if given the opportunity, would I? Probably not"*

Royce Mann, a 14 year-old student in Atlanta, won the school slam poetry competition in 2016 with these words. "White Boy Privilege" was a response to police shootings against Black victims, and his performance went viral with over 14 million views on Facebook (Price & Yuan, 2018).

Openly acknowledging one's own privilege in society may be an important step for majority people in joining political movements initiated by the disadvantaged (Droogendyk, Wright, Lubensky, & Louis, 2016). Injustice awareness is an important basis of ally action (Case, Hansley, & Anderson, 2014; Case, Iuzzini, & Hopkins, 2012, Montgomery, & Stewart, 2012). The perception of injustice implies that a person compares the situation of the disadvantaged group to the situation of the ingroup, and considers their status differences illegitimate (Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). The awareness of privilege is related to ally collective action on behalf of disadvantaged groups (Montgomery & Stewart, 2012).

However, privilege awareness is not common among the majority members: by its nature, privilege is invisible to those who hold it (McIntosh, 1988), and majority participants often avoid the confrontation to it. For example, in case of an intergroup contact, majority people prefer discussing commonalities with minorities instead of discussing injustice, while the process is just the opposite among minorities who wants to deal with injustices more, which phenomenon was elaborated in the introduction as the "irony of harmony" (Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008). Majority people also tend to downplay the severity of the intergroup conflict with minorities (Livingstone, et al, 2015). These strategic reactions to intergroup conflict by majority members serves the maintanence of the status quo and keeping a positive moral image of the ingroup. Therefore, confrontation with privilege can be a threat to the moral image of the majority, as it highlights their undeserved advantaged position in one hand, and their responsibility in the maintenance of the unjust status hierarchy on the other. The reaction to this confrontation can be positive or negative, dependent on the intergroup context.

The framing of injustice as ingroup privilege could make a difference in its effect on intergroup attitudes compared to other framings. In Powell and colleagues' study (2005), injustice was framed either as Black's disadvantage or as White's privilege. In other words, they manipulated the perception of the intergroup situation by making it other-focused vs. self-focused in the disadvantage and privilege conditions respectively. Privilege was a threat to social identity, it increased guilt and decreased modern racism more than messages about disadvantage. The confrontation had increased the perception of unjust status relations and the related emotion of guilt (Powell et al., 2005). This positive reaction to privilege can be expected in supportive contexts, where social norms affirm the ideal of egalitarianism and the recognition of unjust status differences. However, confrontation with privilege leads to opposite effects in cases where intergroup hostility is stronger and the illegitimacy of status relations is questioned in society (Shnabel, Dovidio & Levin, 2016).

In contrast, disadvantage awareness has different implications for attitudes and collective action. Disadvantage of the outgroup is more acceptable and salient for members of the majority than perception of their own privilege. The awareness of unjust disadvantage and focus on the other group might evoke sympathy rather than guilt or anger. Sympathy is a strong predictor of helping intentions, rather than collective action intentions (Harth et al., 2008). Helping intentions that can be also defined as benevolent support, is distinguishable from activist support on the basis of their social change potential. Benevolent support serves the wellbeing of the outgroup in the first place with its focus on the other group. However, group-focus does not necessarily address social change, as motivation to address structural change is based on a reflection on the unjust intergroup situation, and also the responsibiliy of the own group. This activist support involves political actions that directly question the status quo by challenging authoritities and the prevailing status differences between groups by protest behavior (Thomas & McGarty, 2017). In line with this, disadvantage awareness (with its other-focus) was more connected to intergroup helping, while privilege awareness (with its self-focus) was connected to collective action in previous research.

Anti- Roma attitudes and behavior in Hungary

Roma people constitute the largest and most vulnerable ethnic minority group in Eastern Europe and in Hungary (Worldbank, 2015). The Roma group is disadvantaged both in a political and in an ecomocial sense. Their political disadvantage involves the violation of their human rights and their low representation in political decision-making (Council of Europe, 2012), while high poverty, unemployment and systematic segregation contributes to their severe economic disadvantage and marginalisation (Fraser, 1995). Despite the national and European-level attempts on Roma integration, the situation of the Roma did not improve significantly over time (see Sándor et al., 2017). Anti-Roma prejudice plays an important role in maintaining the marginalised position of the Roma. Prejudice functions as a source of legal and institutional discrimination (FRA, 2018), and it is related to the preference for the assimilation or segregation of the Roma people instead of their integration (Stewart, 2012).

As a result of the segregation of Roma people in Hungarian society, positive and equal-status intergroup contact is rare between Roma and non-Roma Hungarians contributing to the persistently large social distance between them (Kende et al, 2017). In contrast to Western contexts where there is an illusion of integration and equal treatment of specific racial minorities (causing a „sedative effect" on collective action), in Eastern Eurepean countries, the low socio-economic position of the Roma in society is widely recognized and known by majority members (Lantos, Kende, Becker, & McGarty, under review). Therefore, the awareness of disadvantage may be salient, but it does not necessarily follow that this disadvantage is perceived as unjust (Harth et al., 2008). Instead, there is some ambivalence in the attitude of majority participants: only 11% agrees with the statement that more social benefits should be given to gipsies than non-gipsies, and at the same time, 82% agreed with the statement "*All gipsy children have the right to attend the same classes as non-gipsies*" (Bernát, Juhász, Krekó & Molnár, 2013). Namely, there is a need for the equal treatment of Roma childen, but the policy of positive discrimination is highly rejected among the majority. This can be interpreted by strong beliefs about the sole responsibility of the Roma in their low status, for example 82% of Hungarians agreed with the following item in an opinion poll in 2011: *„The situation of the Roma would be solved if they would be finally willing to start working" (*Enyedi, Fábián, & Sik, 2004).

The denial of the unjust treatment of the Roma is one problem, but the high levels of hostile and overtly expressed forms of prejudice is also an issue when it comes to the Roma (Bigazzi, 2013; Kende, Tropp, & Lantos, 2016). Anti-Roma prejudice is one of the most blatant forms of bias across Europe, especially in Eastern European countries. In an international survey, 34% of Hungarian respondents agreed that some ethnic minorities are born less intelligent than others (Zick, Küpper & Hövermann, 2011). In another survey, a significant number of participants agreed with the openly rascist statement that criminality is in Roma's blood (Székelyi, Csepeli & Örkény, 2001). It is such a general tendency among Hungarians, that it is independent from demographic variables or political orientation (Keresztes-Takács, Lendvai, Kende,2016). In line with this, the Roma are also targets of the most blatant form of hostility by the majority, dehumanization (Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015). Communication about the Roma in everyday life and by public actors and politicans reinforces this hostility (Orosz, Bruneau, Tropp, Sebestyén, Tóth-Király, 2018), and establish non supportive- norms for Roma inclusion and solidarity in Hungarian society.

These openly hostile norms result in hostile behavior and discrimination toward the Roma (Feischmidt, Szombati, & Szuhay, 2013). As both open and subtle prejudice toward minorities are clear barriers for solidarity, it is especially challenging to find efficient ways to decrease prejudice and increase ally collective intention in these contexts.

There are a few attempts in society to counter these negative tendencies. The roma civil rights movement is present at politics since the transiton, but this movement has a limited impact in national politics, and therefore their effort and success are less visible for majority participants (Kóczé & Rövid, 2012). Majority allies usually participate in NGO's and work for Roma integration programmes in local communities (Trehan & Kóczé,2009), but allies represent a minority who act against the prejudiced everyday, insitutional and societal norms against the Roma.

In a previous research, we measured the effectiveness of sensitivity training with the goal of decreasing anti-Roma prejudice and raising ally collective action intentions among students. We found that it was able to increase positive emotions toward the Roma and also willingness to act on behalf of them (Lantos, Macher, & Kende, 2018). However, we also found an unintended effect of the intervention in questioning the deservingness of the Roma on the long term, because of the high hostility and strong endorsement of stereotypes connected to Roma. These findings suggested that

participants react defensively to confrontation with the intergroup conflict, and interventions should be designed in a way that this resistance are countered.

Research question

Our goal was to explore the connection between privilege and disadvantage awareness and helping and collective action intentions on behalf of the Roma in Hungary, that is, in an intergroup context where the disadvantaged group is highly marginalized, prejudice against them among majority members is high, and the social-political context is non-supportive of collective action. The relevance of this context is highlighted by the fact that we partially replicated a study that was carried out in an entirely different social context, where non-prejudiced norms are higher. Specifically, we asked how cognitive appraisals (privilege or disadvantage), emotions (guilt and sympathy) and perceptions of efficacy and responsibility predict willingness to engage in ally collective action toward a marginalized group.

We received IRB approval for conducting our studies from Eötvös Loránd University.

Study 1

We used the paradigm of Powell, Branscombe and Smith (2005) about the comparison of the effect of privilege versus disadvantage manipulation on modern racism in connection with Roma people in Hungary. First, we conducted a pilot study on a small university sample to test whether the effect described by Powell and colleagues (2005) in the intergroup context between White and Black Americans is applicable to Roma-non-Roma context in Hungary. The importance of pilot-testing the applicability of this paradigm was the different normative context of the studies, as discussions on privilege is absent in public discourse in Hungary. Furthermore, despite some of the similarities in the situation of African Americans in the US and Roma people in Hungary (lower socio-economic status than the average of the majority population, and stereotypes about low intelligence, laziness and being welfare recipients, see e.g. Entman & Rojecki, 2001), there are some clear differences as well. These differences are for example the more homogenous stereotypic perception of the Roma (Bigazzi & Csertő, 2016), and the negative effect of intergroup contact (Kende, Hadarics, & Lasticova, 2017), and with regard to perceptions of privilege and injustices, there is a clear difference in the acknowledgement of the role of white Americans vs.

non-Roma Hungarians in the structural inequalities embedded in historical intergroup relations.

In Study 1 we only tested the effect of the manipulation on privilege awareness, guilt, and sympathy. We measured privilege awareness as a manipulation check. We measured intergroup emotions to test whether they could function as mediators between framing and action intentions in a future study. Feeling thermometer and efficacy beliefs were included as possible moderators of the effect of conditions on privilege awareness. We used additional questions to inform us whether the framing manipulations were differently perceived in terms of agreement with the statements and their novelty.

We had some reasons to be optimistic that despite the differences in recognition of White privilege in the US versus Hungarian contexts, we could expect positive effects of privilege framing on intergroup emotions and modern racism. We expected that exposing majority people with the obvious status differences between themselves and the Roma might lead to the salience of this difference, therefore it can affect intergroup emotions. On the other hand, we also had some concerns whether hostility toward the Roma may cause a backlash (i.e., the denial of unjust status differences and the justification of negative attitudes). However, there was no prior evidence to create different hypotheses than in the original study, therefore we hypothesized the following:

(1) Priming privilege would increase privilege awareness and guilt more than priming disadvantage.

(2) Priming disadvantage would increase sympathy more than priming privilege.

(3) We expected that effects of privilege vs. disadvantage awareness on intergroup emotions would be moderated by positive attitudes (i.e., the differences would be larger when attitudes are more positive) and by perceived efficacy (i.e., the differences would be larger when efficacy beliefs are higher).

Method

Participants and procedure. We relied on a university student sample where students received course credit for participation (N = 132). The language of the research was Hungarian. We created the online experiment on Qualtrics.

Considering that the sample was rather homogenous, we did not collect any background information on participants for the pilot study. Participants were randomly

directed to one of four conditions, the first two conditions were identical to those in the original study: (1) list of own group privileges, (2) list of outgroup disadvantages, and in addition we used two more conditions: (3) privilege generating and (4) disadvantage generating conditions. In the first and second conditions, participants were given a list of sentences about privileges of non-Roma people and disadvantages of the Roma respectively, whereas in the third and fourth conditions, participants were asked to come up with their own examples to own group privilege and outgroup disadvantage. We decided to use both types of manipulation in the pilot study, as we had concerns whether the list of privileges and disadvantages would be too confrontational, causing reactance among participants. We expected that because generating their own examples gives more freedom to participants, there would be less reactance to the task. Furthermore, we expected that generating these examples would create higher involvement of participants.

Items in the list conditions were originally used by McIntosh (1988) who established the concept of privilege and were applied again in the study of Powell and colleagues (2005). In the privilege condition, for example: *"Hungarians can participate in everyday situations without the feelings of rejection because of their skin colour."* and *"Hungarians can expect that security guards will not give them special attention or bother them when they are shopping."* In the disadvantage list condition, the instruction and the items were almost identical but framed from the perspective of Roma disadvantage. For example: *"Roma people participate in everyday situations where they experience the feelings of rejection because of their skin colour."* and *"Roma people can expect that security guards will give them special attention or bother them when they are shopping."*

In the privilege generating condition, participants were asked to come up with their own examples of privilege when they think of their situation compared to Roma people. In the disadvantage generating condition the instruction was simply reframed to the disadvantages of the Roma.

Measures. A 9-point *feeling thermometer* was used to measure prejudice toward the Roma (How likeable do you find members of the Roma group?). All other items were measured on a 7-point scale from 1=completely disagree to 7=completely agree.

A measure of *privilege awareness* was used with a five-item scale by Swim and Miller (1999), for example „Hungarians have certain privileges Roma people do not have in society." ($\alpha = .79$).

We measured the feelings of *guilt* with three items by a shortened version of guilt measure by Branscombe, Slugoski, and Kappen (2004) was used, as in the original study of Powell and colleagues (2005): „I feel guilty about the bad things other Hungarians did to Roma people" , „I feel guilty about the harm Hungarians did to Roma", „I think I should help restoring the harm Hungarians did to Roma" (α = .91), (α = .92).

The scale of *sympathy* was based on the three items used by Iyer and colleagues (2003) „I feel sympathy with the Roma because of their bad situation", „I feel sympathy because of the bad things concerning the Roma" , „I do not feel sympathy with the Roma" (reversed scored).

We measured *efficacy beliefs* with a single item, based on previous measures on efficacy (see for example van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004): „I believe that the situation of Roma people can be improved with the appropriate means."

Finally, only in the list conditions, we asked how participants reacted to the items of privilege or disadvantage in their respective conditions, as a *manipulation check*. The following five items were used: „I agreed with most of the statements.", „The statements made me think.", „The statements did NOT influence me emotionally.", „Some of the statements were surprising.", „Most of the items did not tell anything new to me."

In all conditions, at the end of the questionnaire we gave the opportunity for participants to share their opinion about the research with their own words in an open-ended question. *For the experiment, see Appendix A.*

Results

Descriptive statistics. Each condition had 33 participants. According to the feeling thermometer, participants indicated a rather negative attitude toward the Roma. Privilege awareness and sympathy toward the Roma were close to the midpoint, while guilt toward them were below the midpoint. Efficacy that the situation of the Roma can be improved was above the midpoint. Participants in general agreed with the statements in Privilege list condition and Disadvantage list condition, and they reported that the items made them think. The statements about emotional impact were low, being surprising were rather low, while novelty was close to the midpoint. For descriptive statitistics see Table x.

Hypothesis testing. There was no significant difference in any of the measured variables between the four conditions. One exception was an item from the manipulation check used in Condition 1 and 2, „*Most of the items did not tell anything new to me*.", where T-test showed that participants in the privilege list condition agreed with this to a smaller degree than in the disadvantaged condition, suggesting that information on own group privilege was less known to participants. *For the results of the T-test analysis see Table 1.*

Table 1

Descriptive statistics and one- way ANOVA in Study 1 (between all four conditions)

			One-way ANOVA (Welch's)			
	M	SD	F	df1	df2	p
1. Feeling thermometer	4.67	1.87	0.27	3	71.1	0.844
2. Privilege awareness	3.92	1.36	0.01	3	70.7	0.999
3. Sympathy	3.89	1.69	0.07	3	71.0	0.976
4. Guilt	3.34	1.65	0.87	3	71.1	0.461
5. Efficacy	4.73	1.64	0.60	3	70.5	0.617

Table 2

Descriptive statistics and independent samples T-test on manipulation checks in Study 1 (between Condition 1 and 2)

	Privilege condition		Disadvantage condition		Independent samples T-test		
	M	SD	M	SD	t	df	p
1. I agreed with most of the statements.	4.55	1.37	4.85	1.50	-0.856	64.0	0.395
2. The statements made me think.	4.91	1.77	4.91	1.94	0.000	64.0	1.000
3. The statements did NOT influence me emotionally.	3.42	1.82	3.58	2.21	-0.304	64.0	0.762
4. Some of the statements were surprising.	3.61	1.82	3.42	1.82	0.381	64.0	0.704
5. Most of the items did not tell anything new to me.	3.67	1.78	4.67	1.87	-2.228	64.0	0.029

We expected that participants were characterized by different level of efficacy perceptions about the intergroup situation and different feelings toward the outgroup, and we did not expect these variables to be affected by the manipulation. Therefore we used these variables as moderators to test whether those higher in efficacy perceptions and positive feelings toward the Roma, were affected by our manipulation more.

Moderation analysis with Hayes' Process Macro (2013, using Model 1) showed that efficacy did not moderate the effect of conditions on privilege awareness ($F(1,128) = 1.01$, $p = .317$), guilt ($F(1,128) = .24$, $p = .626$) or sympathy ($F(1,128) = .06$, $p = .801$). Similarly, feeling thermometer was not a significant moderator, either on privilege awareness ($F(1,128) = .125$, $p = .724$), guilt ($F(1,128) = 1.55$, $p = .215$) and sympathy ($F(1,128) = .48$, $p = .490$).

Analysis of written responses and comments. In order to gain a better understanding of the failed manipulation we looked at the responses in the privilege and disadvantage generating conditions, to get an impression how participants interpreted these concepts. In the privilege generating condition, out of 33 responses there were only two respondents who openly denied the privilege of Hungarians compared to the Roma: ,,*I think that it is a false assumption that I am privileged compared to the Roma. I think the opposite is true, for example, for me it is a problem to walk on the streets after dark, while for Roma people it is not".* Most respondents listed similar sentences to the ones we used in the privilege list condition *(e.g. „I am not a target of discrimination at school, I can more easily get hired for a job, etc".).*

In the disadvantage generating conditions there were also two respondents who explicitly denied Roma disadvantage (for example *„I don't think Roma have any disadvantage, I think it is just the opposite. They have the same rights to live and study anywhere, they may even have advantage compared to non-Roma people.").* This confirms that most participants understood the task, and acknowledged privilege and disadvantage respectively.

We also looked at the comments about the questionnaire in all conditions to see if we can find a pattern in the responses. Giving a comment was optional, and we received 36 comments altogether. Seven comments were from the first, eight from the second, ten from the third, and ten from the fourth condition. I identified three salient themes in the texts: criticism about the study, expression of prejudice, and expression of ambivalence. Criticism meant any responses that reflected the topic or the method of the study in a critical way. Expression of prejudice involved responses where participants expressed their negative attitudes toward the Roma. Ambivalence meant that respondents not only expressed their prejudice, but also reflected on their need to resolve the negative intergroup relation. For example*: ,,My bad personal experiences contributed to my negative opinion about the Roma, but I am optimistic and hope my opinion will change, as I don't like being negative." „I like and respect Roma culture,*

and I did not have conflict with the Roma, but the conflict between the two groups is a sensitive topic, and both groups are full of prejudice." „I think that we should look at both sides to solve this issue and come to a compromise to change unjust relations." Some of these ambivalent comments reflected on the lack of efficacy in solving the problem. For example:„*The basic mindset of people should be changed, that is either impossible or takes a lot of time, sometimes I feel this country is full of hopeless people.", „I agreed most of the items, but I don't think I should feel personal responsibility about the discrimination that Roma people face."*

Additionally, the coexistence of criticism and prejudice expression was interpreted as a clear backlash reaction to the study where participants expressed their prejudice as a resistance to the study. Examples of this resistance were the following: „*The statements were biased, it deals with Hungarians as they were rascist and vindictive, but actually the statements are rascist, prejudiced and very provocative.", „I think that actually we Hungarians are disadvantaged in our own country and Rome enjoy special treatment."*

Two independent coders, who were blind to the experimental conditions, were asked to use these four codes to categorize the comments. Interrater-reliability between the three coders was counted based on the number of agreed codes compared to the total number of assigned codes. Interrater-reliability in each code was above 78%. *For the distribution of codes on comments between conditions, see Table 3.*

Table 3

Distribution of agreed codes on comments between conditions

	Privilege list	Disadvantage list	Privilege generating	Disadvantage generating	All codes
Criticism about the study	4	4	4	4	16
Prejudice	4	0	2	5	11
Ambivalence	1	2	1	2	6
Backlash (criticism+prejudice)	3	0	3	3	9
All codes	12	6	10	14	

There were no salient patterns in the distribution of comment categories between conditions, therefore we understood that both privilege and disadvantage conditions were threatening to participants, resulting in different forms of resistance to the study (either in the form of criticism, in the form of prejudice expression, or both).

Discussion of Study 1

We did not find the expected differences between privilege and disadvantage conditions. Privilege conditions did not raise privilege awareness and guilt compared to the disadvantage conditions, while disadvantage conditions did not raise sympathy compared to the privilege conditions, neither when participants were confronted with a list of statements, nor when they had the chance to come up with their own examples. The only difference was that the privilege list seemed more novel to the participants than the disadvantage list. This finding is in line with the expectation that own group privilege is more invisible to members of the majority than outgroup disadvantage. Nevertheless, awareness raising about privilege did not lead to the expected outcomes.

The generated responses showed that most participants recognized the concepts and it did not create a difficulty for them to list appropriate examples of disadvantage and privilege. Still, most comments were ambivalent: many of them acknowledged existing prejudice toward the Roma, but also reflected on this as a problem that should be resolved. They also mentioned helplessness about possible ways of change, and many tried to justify prejudice by personal bad experience with the Roma. Some comments were even more defensive: they rejected the concept of privilege, and found the manipulations provoking, and expressed open prejudice toward the Roma. We intrepreted these reactions as a backlash to the confrontation with disadvantage and privilege.

Overall, the comments demonstrated that the manipulations moved some participants emotionally, but it did not lead to a measurable difference between conditions. Most participants did not share a comment in the end, therefore we could draw limited conclusions from this analysis. As comments were quite similar in all conditions, another possibility is that privilege and disadvantage framing were not perceived differently, and they were both perceived as too confrontational and unpleasant for participants. Similarly to the original study, we did not use a control group, so we could not measure how awareness raising affected participants compared to the baseline.

A possible explanation for the lack of effect is that the intergroup conflict between Roma and non-Roma people in Hungary is more hostile than the relationship between Blacks and Whites in the United States, and privilege is a less recognized concept in this context. In the study of Powell et al (2005) privilege framing was a more efficient way of raising awareness among majority people, compared to disadvantage framing, because in this intergroup context modern (and not open) forms of prejudice stops people from engaging in ally action because it suggests that the problem of racism no longer exists, and not because of the lack of awareness of historical privileges. Since the civil rights movement in the US, concepts of White privilege and White guilt are discussed in the academic field as well as in everyday life as something deeply embedded in the history of slavery in the US, therefore members of the majority are not only familiar with these ideas, but also exposed to related norms of egalitarianism and social equality. Therefore, privilege framing could activate the already existing White privilege awareness and White guilt that is embedded in the historical relations between White and African American people (i.e., awareness of slavery). In contrast, privilege awareness is not part of Roma-non-Roma relations in Hungary, and therefore activation of privilege did not have the same affect as in the study of Powell.

However, the overall backlash effect we observed in comments suggested that not only privilege, but also Roma disadvantage provoked ambivalent reactions, so not only the self-focus of privilege was assumably threatening to participants, but the confrontation with the issue of intergroup relations in general. Feeling thermometer showed that attitudes were rather negative, therefore it is a great challenge to bring about changes with such simple manipulations in the lab. We decided to try to repeat the study with an outgroup that presumably raises less defensive reactions in participants, to identify whether privilege versus disadvantage framing could convey its effect in a less hostile intergroup context.

Study 2

Following the findings of our pilot study, we wanted to rely on an intergroup context in which participants already have some level of awareness about own group privilege and where outgroup prejudice is lower. Therefore, in Study 2, participants had the opportunity to choose the intergroup situation that they find relevant when talking about ingroup privilege and outgroup disadvantage. We kept the item-generating condition, so participants could share their own opinion, in contrast to the

confrontational method of giving statements of privilege and disadvantage. We added a control condition to be able to measure the effect of awareness raising that happens in both the privilege and the disadvantage conditions.

Our goal was to minimize the threateing effect of the privilege manipulation to reduce the potential backlash effect, and therefore, we did not assign a specific outgroup in the manipulation but allowed respondents to choose a group from a list that we provided on the basis of their own choice as the best example of (own) privilege or (other) disadvantage. We extended the scope of the study and distinguished between different levels of action: action that directly address social change (autonomy-oriented action, after Nadler's terminology), and action that does not address social change, but is nevertheless prosocial (helping, or dependency-oriented action). We expected that the recognition of injustice by different framings would influence whether participants choose dependency- or autonomy-oriented forms of action.

Hypotheses.

(1) Privilege (via perceived responsibility and efficacy of the ingroup and guilt) was expected to decrease modern prejudice and lead to collective action intention for social change, and autonomy-oriented donation intention, compared to control condition.

(2) We expected that exposing participants with disadvantage would increase sympathy, helping and dependency-oriented donation intentions, compared to control condition.

(3) Both treatment conditions were expected to decrease perceived responsibility of the outgroup compared to the control group.

(4) Emotions were expected to mediate the effects between treatment conditions and behavioral outcomes.

Method

Procedure. In order to generate a list of intergroup contexts, we conducted a brief pilot test among attendants of two Social Psychology practical classes, and asked them to name a disadvantaged group in society. The most often mentioned examples were poor people, people with low level of education, people living in villages, and Roma people. We used these examples as the list of intergroup contexts that participants could choose from. We worked with the expectation that participants would choose a group that they do not reject, as they admit the chosen group's disadvantage or their

own privilege, so we can avoid backlash effects. Our analysis plan was to test if all the selected intergroup contexts functioned similarly, so first we tested whether there was a difference in dependent variables based on group choices. Then, we conducted an ANOVA to compare the three conditions: control, privilege and disadvantage along all dependent variables. Finally, we planned to conduct mediation analysis on the effect of guilt and sympathy between conditions and behavioral measures. *For the questionnaire of the experiment in Study 2, see Appendix B.*

Participants. A university student sample was used in Hungary, where students received course credit for participation (N = 169). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a privilege, a disadvantage and a control condition. In the experimental conditions, participants were instructed to view intergroup relation either from the perspective of their own group's privilege, or the outgroup's disadvantage. In the privilege condition, people were asked to pick a group out of four options that they belong to, and they think possess privilege in society. In the disadvantage condition, participants were asked to think of a group that suffer disadvantages, and that they do not belong to, and list five examples of their disadvantage. In the control condition, we did not highlight neither privilege, nor disadvantage, we only asked participants to pick a group membership out of the four that they belong to and find significant in their lives.

Measures. We used the same scales to measure *feeling thermometer* (but this time, we did not use a 9-point but a 100-point scale to increase variance in responses), *guilt* (3 items, $\alpha = .82$) and *sympathy (3 items,* $\alpha = .82$), as in Study 1, but participants were asked to think of the ingroup and the outgroup they have chosen. The *privilege awareness* scale had a low reliability (5 items, $\alpha = .61$), so we excluded one item to increase the internal consistency of the scale („My membership in my group gives me undeserved privileges in society."), so the remaining four items had an acceptable reliability ($\alpha = .69$).

Efficacy beliefs was measured by two items: *„I believe that the situation of the other group can be improved with the relevant means." „I believe that members of my group are able to improve the situation of the other group."(*$r = .53$ $p < .001$*).*

We measured the perceived *responsibility* of the ingroup and the outgroup with the following items: „To what extent do you find your ingroup responsible for the problems of the outgroup?" „To what extent do you find the outgroup responsible for their problems?"

Modern prejudice was measured by five items from the original study by Powell and colleagues (2005), for example:„The society has managed to ensure that my ingroup and the other group have equal chances to reach their goals." However, the scale had a very low reliability in the sample (α = .20), so we were not able to use it. Presumably, the scale items were interpreted differently across the different intergroup contexts, therefore the same items about different outgroups did not produce an acceptable scale.

Finally, we measured *collective action intentions* with two methods. First, participants were instructed to allocate 100% probability among three options of action: what is the likeliness of choosing collective action for social change, helping or non - action. Participants read about three scenarios of disadvantage: material disadvantage, difficulties in the labour market and level of education, and had to decide on action intentions in each scenario. One example was the following: *„Please, think of the other group's material disadvantage. What is the likeliness of choosing the following options? 1. I would participate in an action with the goal of giving opportunities for more equal salaries (even by decreasing the gap between our groups). 2. I would participate in an action with the goal of decreasing the material problems of the other group. 3. I would not participate in any of the actions.*"

Secondly, two NGO's with different profiles were introduced to participants, one with a profile of providing autonomy-oriented, or social change-oriented help, while the other offering dependency- oriented help. Participants were asked to distribute 10.000 HUF charity between the two organizations. The descriptions of the dependency-oriented NGO was the following: „*Together Caritative Foundation" deals with donations, so they can provide help to meet the needs of the other group. Their activities involve: offering food, donating clothes, donating things and food to different locations, donating money."*

The autonomy-oriented foundation was introduced with the text: „*For Equal Opportunities Foundation" deals with programs that teach skills to the other group. Their activities involve: preparement for job interviews, community building, helping children to be more successful at school, giving legal assistance."*

Finally, participants were asked to pick one activity out of all the listed activites from both NGO's that they find the most useful, and one they find the least useful, and give arguments to their choices. We chose these methods for measuring collective action intentions partly to increase the external validity of the scales, and partly because

traditional collective action intention items are not applicable to different intergroup contexts.

Results

Analysis of group choice. Participants were randomly assigned to a privilege condition (n = 54), a disadvantage condition (n = 55), and a control condition (n = 60). In the privilege condition, half of participants chose highly educated people as an ingroup, while the others chose from the other three options. Ratio of choices were different in the disadvantage condition, where half of the participants, chose Roma as an outgroup, and the other three choices were more equally chosen. In the control conditon, half of the participants chose highly educated people as an ingroup, and the others chose from the other options. Therefore privilege and control conditions turned out to function similarly, as in both cases, participants were instructed to choose an ingroup, while in the disadvantage condition, they were asked to choose an outgroup. The instruction for self-focus resulted in choosing highly educated people as an ingroup in the control and the privilege condition, but the other-focus resulted in choosing Roma as an outgroup in the disadvantage condition. *For the distribution of group choices among participants, see Table 4.*

Table 4

Distribtion of group choices between conditions in Study 2

	Privilege	Disadvantage	Control
Highly educated- Poorly educated	27 (50%)	7 (12.7%)	27 (45%)
City inhabitant- Village inhabitant	11 (20.4%)	10 (18.2 %)	10 (16.7%)
Majority - Roma	8 (14.8%)	26 (47.3 %)	11(18.3%)
Middle class- Poor	8 (14.8%)	12(21.8 %)	12 (20 %)
All	54 (100%)	55 (100%)	60 (100%)

According to our analysis plan, we tested whether there were differences between the chosen intergroup contexts within each condition, to see whether choice has any unexpected effects on dependent variables. We found difference only between chosing the Roma outgroup vs. all other outgroups. In the privilege condition, those who chose majority (non-Roma) Hungarians (compared to Roma people), scored lower in the feeling thermometer toward the outgroup compared to the other choices, scored higher in perceived responsibility of the outgroup, scored lower in efficacy to reduce the problem, and scored higher in their intention for taking no action. There was no such difference in privilege awareness, guilt, sympathy, perceived responsibility of the ingroup, intention for social change, helping and donation.

We did the same analysis in the disadvantage condition, where we found the same differences between the choices in feeling thermometer, perceived responsibility of the outgroup and non- action. There were no differences in all other variables: privilege awareness, guilt, sympathy, efficacy to reduce the problem, perceived responsibility of the ingroup, intention for helping, social change and donation.

Finally, we found similar patterns in the control condition, with differences in the feeling thermometer, perceived responsibility of the outgroup, and sympathy. We also found a tendency for difference in social change and helping intentions, interestingly, participants who chose the Roma as an outgroup were more willing to choose social change intentions and less willing to choose helping intentions compared to the other groups. We found no differences in all other variables.

As the choice of the Roma outgroup had a distinct effect on variables, we decided to conduct two analysis. First, we conducted an ANOVA on the whole sample (N = 169), and then we conducted an analysis excluding the subgroup who chose the Roma (n = 124). We were not able to conduct an analysis with the Roma-chosing subgroup alone, as there were too few participants in these conditions to get a meaningful result (n = 45). In the interpretations we have to take into consideration that the analysis conducted on the whole sample is influenced by the different assessment of the Roma- non-Roma subgroup.

Descriptive statistics. As comparisons between group choices demonstrated the significantly less favorable assessments given in the Roma- non-Roma subgroup, we report the desriptives of all other choices together, by excluding the choice of the Roma versus majority subgroup. Attitudes toward the outgroups were rather positive measured by the feeling thermometer. Privilege awareness was high, sympathy was above the midpoint and guilt was somewhat lower. Participants did not feel that their ingroup can be held responsible for the disadvantage of the outgroup. Responsibility attribution to the outgroup was close to the midpoint. Efficacy to improve the situation was high. Helping intention were the most frequently chosen behavioral intention, that was followed by chosing non- action, and social change. Helping intention had a significant positive correlation with feeling thermometer, sympathy and efficacy, and a significant but less strong connection to guilt. Interestingly, it was not connected to privilege awareness, but was connected to the perceived responsibility of the ingroup. In contrast, collective action intentions had negative connections to the these variables, while choosing non- action had no significant connections with them. These findings suggest that those with positive attitudes toward the outgroup preferred the choice of helping intentions over collective action intentions. *For descriptive statistics and correlations in Study 2, see Table 5.*

Table 5

Descriptive statistics and correlations in Study 2

	M	SD	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. Feeling thermometer	65.46	24.21	1	.027	.214**	.126	.196*	.095	-.281**	.387**	-,305**	-,172*
2. Privilege awareness	5.28	1.22		1	.114	-.059	.136	.003	-.019	.025	-,120	,077
3. Sympathy	4.19	.71			1	.163*	.249**	.059	-.189*	.261**	-,251**	-,081
4. Guilt	3.46	1.53				1	.263**	.554**	-.037	.179*	-,258**	,056
5. Efficacy	5.52	1.36					1	.296**	.017	.255**	-,312**	,013
6. Responsibility of the ingroup	3.07	1.40						1	.177*	.043	-,197*	,151
7. Responsibility of the outgroup	3.95	1.48							1	-.088	,093	,023
8. Helping intention	44.99	15.1								1	-,623**	-,573**
9. Social change intention	22.28	12.11									1	-,265**
10. Non-action	32.81	13.43										1

However, in the choice between donating to the autonomy- oriented versus dependency- oriented NGO's, the former was the more popular choice (autonomy: M = 6235.57, SD = 2206.71; dependency: M = 3764.43, SD = 2206.71).

Hypothesis testing. We used one-way ANOVA to compare the three conditions, including the Roma subgroups. There were no significant differences in privilege awareness between conditions (F (2, 164) = 1.17, p = .314, η^2 = .01). Interestingly, we found a non-significant tendency for differences in the choice of both non-action (F (2,166) = 2.65, p = .074, η^2 = .03) and helping (F (2,166) = 2.36, p = .098, η^2 = .03), where action intentions were lower in the disadvantage condition compared to control. *For the results of the ANOVA, see Table 6.*

Table 6

Descriptive statistics and one- way ANOVA in Study 2 (in the full sample)

	One-way ANOVA (Welch's)			
	F	df1	df2	p
1. Feeling thermometer	0.76	2	110	0.469
2. Privilege awareness	1.18	2	109	0.310
3. Sympathy	0.25	2	107	0.778
4. Guilt	0.44	2	110	0.642
5. Efficacy	1.05	2	107	0.353
6. Responsibility of the ingroup	0.57	2	109	0.568
7. Responsibility of the outgroup	1.24	2	109	0.294
8. Helping intention	2.72	2	107	0.070
9. Social change intention	0.07	2	110	0.930
10. Non- action	2.67	2	109	0.074

In the donation task, there was a difference between the support of the two NGO's between conditions ($F(2,166) = 4.51$; $p = .012$, $\eta 2 = .05$). Post hoc test showed that the difference occurred between disadvantage and privilege conditions ($F(2,166) = 4.51$; $p = .011$) , but there was no difference compared to the control condition ($p = .606$). The autonomy- oriented NGO was supported more by participants in the disadvantage condition ($M = 7042.02$, $SD = 2140.55$) compared to the privilege condition ($M = 5808.89$, $SD = 2409.25$), while the dependency oriented NGO was supported more by those in the privilege condition ($M = 4191.11$, $SD = 2409.25$), compared to the disadvantage condition ($M = 2957.98$, $SD = 2140.55$).

There were no significant differences in either guilt ($F(2,166) = 4.28$; $p = .652$, $\eta 2 = .01$), or sympathy ($F(2,166) = .28$; $p = .756$, $\eta 2 = .003$) between conditions. As emotions had a significant positive correlation with only helping intentions, we tested whether emotions would function as mediators between conditions and helping intentions. We conducted a mediation analysis with Hayes' Process Macro (2013). *For the demonstration of our results with the mediation analysis, see Figure 1.*



Figure 1. Testing the mediating role of guilt and sympathy on helping intentions.

There was no effect of conditions on guilt ($B = -.08$, $F(1,167) = .274$, $p = .601$), we only found a significant effect of guilt on helping intentions ($B = 1.81$, $F(2,166)$, $p = .023$), so guilt did not mediate the effect of conditions on helping. Similarly, conditions did not predict sympathy ($B = -0.11$, $F(1,167)$, $p = .869$), but sympathy predicted helping intentions ($B = 5.69$, $F(2,166)$, $p < .001$), so sympathy did not mediate the effect

of conditions on helping. The effect of sympahty was stronger on helping intentions compared to guilt.

There were no differences between conditions in the feeling thermometer ($F(2,166) = .795$; $p = .453$), efficacy ($F(2,166) = .997$; $p = .371$) and perceived responsibility of the ingroup ($F(2,166) = .523$; $p = .594$) and the outgroup ($F(2,166) = 1.23$; p = .293).

Finally, as the choice of Roma as an outgroup functioned differently from the other three choices, we conducted an analysis where we excluded people who chose the Roma outgroup. ANOVA showed that there was only one variable, the perceived responsibility of the outgroup that differed in the three conditions ($F(2,120)= 3.57$; $p = .031$, $\eta 2 = .06$). Tukey post hoc test revealed that participants in the disadvantage condition assessed the outgroup as significantly less responsible for their disadvantage ($p = .031$, $n = 28$; $M = 3.46$, $SD = 1.45$), compared to the control condition ($n = 49$, $M = 4.35$, $SD = 1.54$). For a visual presentation of the result, see Figure 2.

There was no difference between the control and the privilege condition ($p = .191$, $n = 46$, $M = 3.83$, $SD = 1.36$).



Figure 2. Differences in perceived responsibility of the outgroup between conditions

We found no differences in the other dependent variables, such as intentions for social change ($F(2,121)= .724$; $p = .487$, $\eta^2 = .01$), helping ($F(2,121) = .993$; $p = .374$, $\eta^2 = .02$) or non-action ($F(2,121) = .091$; $p = .913$, $\eta^2 = .001$). There was no difference in preference for autonomy or dependency- oriented donation, either ($F(2,121) = 2.04$; $p = .135$, $\eta^2 = .03$). Privilege awareness ($F(2,120) = .424$; $p = .655$, $\eta^2 = .01$), guilt

($F(2,121) = 1.49$; $p = .230$, $\eta^2 = .02$), sympathy ($F(2,121) = 1.35$; $p = .263$, $\eta^2 = .02$), perceived responsibility of the ingroup ($F(2,121) = .171$; $p = .843$, $\eta^2 = .004$), and efficacy ($F(2,120) = .689$; $p = .504$, $\eta^2 = .01$) did not show difference, either.

We conducted moderation analysis with Hayes' Process Macro (2013) to test whether differences in perceived responsibility of the outgroup moderated the effect of the conditions on behavioral intentions, but we found no significant effects in any of the dependent variables (non-action intention: $\Delta R^2 = .03$, $F(3, 119) = 1.18$, $p = .32$; helping intention: $\Delta R^2 = .04$, $F(3, 119) = 14.61$, $p = .154$; social change intention: $\Delta R^2 = .01$, $F(3, 119) = .487$, $p = .692$).

Analysis of open-ended responses. Text responses showed that participants recognized the disadvantages of the outgroups they chose, even the disadvantage of the Roma. It seems that it did not cause any difficulties for participants to list privileges and disadvantages in the treatment conditions.

When we analysed the responses for the open question, which forms of action by an NGO they find the most versus the least useful, the vast majority of respondents found „*helping children to be more successful at school*" as most useful, and chose *„donating money"* as the least useful. Their arguments showed that most of the respondents think about long-term solutions of the problems, and recognized that autonomy-oriented helping is more suitable for bringing about social change. Many respondents argued that they have concerns about donating money, as they can't be sure whether the donation will actually reach people in need. There were some respondents who stated that donation is also a very important form of helping, because starvation is still an issue. However, the overall pattern was clear that some people find both forms of actions important (but find donation as more urgent), but the majority has a preference for autonomy-oriented forms of helping.

Discussion of Study 2

Participants who chose the Roma as an outgroup showed differences in comparison to the other choices (poor people, poorly educated people, and people living in small villages) in a number of measured variables. They indicated less warm feelings toward the outgroup, showed higher perceived responsibility of the outgroup, and were more likely to take no action on behalf of the outgroup in all conditions. They even had lower perceived efficacy in the privilege condition, and lower sympathy in the control

condition. These results showed that prejudice toward the Roma (even if participants dealt with this group voluntarily, and were able to list a number of disadvantage of the Roma) had a crucial effect on attitudes and behavioral intentions.

When choosing between autonomy vs. dependency- oriented NGO's, the former was more popular in the disadvantage condition, while the latter was more popular in the privilege condition. These results indicate some ambivalence in relation to Roma people in the disadvantage condition: they were less likely to engage in helping, and more likely to choose non- action compared to the control group, but when they were given the chance of donating, they preferred the autonomy-oriented action to dependency-oriented action. It is likely that besides their biased perception toward the Roma, participants were still willing to look at the disadvantage of the Roma as a problem, and identify helping as an inappropriate response to that. Another explanation may be that manipulation caused a backlash effect on participants, so they became less willing to engage in action on behalf of the Roma. Emotions of guilt and sympathy were both significant predictors of helping and collective action intentions, but were not predictors of choosing non- action. Nevertheless, attitudes and emotions toward the outgroup did not differ between experimental conditions.

When we conducted an analysis excluding participants who chose the Roma outgroup, we only found a limited effect of the manipulation: only perceived responsibility of the outgroup was lower in the disadvantage condition compared to the control condition. This change in attribution of responsibility was not enough to influence behavioral intentions.

Interestingly, there was a relatively high awareness of privilege in all conditions, but this was not paired with an increased level of responsibility of the ingroup, and sympathy or guilt toward the outgroups. Despite the high level of perceived efficacy, social change was the least often selected option compared to non- action and helping. However, when participants were forced to choose from two forms of donations, the vast majority of them preferred the autonomy-oriented option, that was also supported by their selected explanations.

Limitations of Study 2

First of all, our manipulation turned out to lead to some biases in terms of other-focus and self-focus. We did not aim to make our control condition a self-focused condition, as we only wanted to manipulate the emphasis of privilege and disadvantage,

which we did not empasize in the the control condition. Still, the instruction was similar in the control and the privilege condition, where participants were asked to pick an ingroup, compared to the disadvantage condition where they had to choose an outgroup. This difference led more participants to choose Roma (compared to majority Hungarians) in the disadvantage condition, while most of them chose highly educated people (compared to poorly educated) in the privilege and the control conditions. This demonstrated that in case of self-focus, the group with high education level was the most salient ingroup for university students, while in case of other-focus and disadvantage, Roma was the most salient outgroup for them.

Conclusion of Study 2

Despite the fact that the disadvantaged groups of the Roma, the poor, the poorly educated and people living in small villages overlap, Roma as an outgroup is connected to less favorable attitudes and behavioral intentions compared to the others. At the same time, it seemed that participants were willing to recognize the disadvantage of Roma people, when they were instructed to come up with their own examples, and we did not face such a strong backlash and denial of disadvantage as in the pilot study. Yet, we have faced similar limitations, as participants in the treatment conditions reacted with decreased behavioral intentions. However, it did not mean they did not acknowledge the importance of social change, as indicated in their choice and selected explanations to the donation task. Overall, it seems that injustice awareness and the importance of social change was acknowledged. Participants had rather low sense of responsibility and low level of prosocial emotions (like sympathy and guilt) that could actually motivate them for ally collective action. Raising solidarity for an outgroup is very limited, if awareness is only present at a cognitive level, and a shared social identity and mobilizing emotions are missing (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2006; Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008).

The limited effects of privilege awareness manipulation on emotions and behavioral intentions we found in the experimental studies left us with the question, whether the concept privilege functioned the same way among Hungarian respondents, as among US respondents in the original study. Namely, we expected that privilege awareness is able to raise guilt and decrease modern racism, based on Powell and colleague's study, and it would be connected to collective action intentions, based on previous correlational data (Montgomery, & Stewart, 2012). As we did not get the

expected effects, we continued our work with two assumptions: (1) It is possible that we failed manipulating privilege awareness. Possibly privilege manipulation was not strong enough to impact participants' attitudes, or they did not want to comply with the perceived goals of the study (e.g. shifting their attitudes in a positive direction), as the manipulation was too explicit. (2) Privilege awareness is not related to behavioral intentions in the Hungarian population. Privilege awareness is more absent from discourse on intergroup relations in the Hungarian context compared to dominant discourses in the US, and therefore it could not function as an independent variable in the experiments. We aimed to test our second assumption by relying on cross-sectional evidence.

Study 3

In our experimental study, we only had ambivalent effects of disadvantage on the dependent variables, specifically, we found a backlash effect on helping intentions (in case of the Roma), and an increase on the perceived responsibility of the ingroup (toward other disadvantaged groups). Outgroup disadvantage is more salient from the perspective of the majority compared to ingroup privilege (Powell et al., 2006), which effect may even be stronger in the Eastern European context, where privilege is less talked about in media and politics. Therefore, we expected that disadvantage awareness would have a stronger connection to behavioral intentions of the majority than privilege awareness. We investigated the connection between privilege and disadvantage awareness and behavioral intentions (e.g. donation and collective action intentions).

In the open ended questions of our pilot experiment, when participants were confronted with the situation of the Roma compared to the non-Roma majority, low perceived efficacy was mentioned in changing the situation of the Roma as a justification of prejudice and the absence of action intentions. Therefore, we tested whether perceived efficacy would moderate the connection between privilege awareness and collective action intention.

Hypotheses. (1) We expected that privilege awareness had only a weak connection to behavioral outcomes, compared to disadvantage awareness that is a stronger predictor of behavioral intentions. (2) Efficacy was expected to moderate the effect of privilege awareness on behavioral outcomes. Namely, we expected a stronger connection among those high in perceived efficacy, compared to those who believed that the situation of the Roma could not be changed.

Method

Participants and Procedure. We relied on an online survey in 2016 as part of an omnibus research in Hungary (N = 1007). Participants were recruited online at our request by a survey company using a multiple-step, proportionally stratified, probabilistic sampling method of an online participant pool resulting in a sample demographically similar to the Hungarian population in terms of age, gender, level of education, and type of settlement. We targeted N = 1000 that is typically used in opinion poll surveys relying on representative samples of Hungarian society (for the

accuracy of estimating election results in Hungary using different sample sizes see Poll of polls, 2018).

Fifty-one percent of participants were women, their average age was 41.5 years, with a standard deviation of 13 years. Thirty-nine percent of participants had a degree in higher education, 46.1 % had finished secondary school, 2.9% had not finished secondary school and 11.6 % chose the "other" option. 19% lived in Budapest, 54% lived in smaller towns, and 27% in a village.

Measures. In all measures 7-point Likert type- scales were used (from 1 = Completely disagree to 7 = Completely agree). We used the same measure for *privilege awareness* that was used in Study 1.

Disadvantage awareness was measured by two items, for example: "Members of the Roma minority are disadvantaged in terms of their rights, compared to the Hungarian majority".

Donation intentions were measured by two items, for example: "I would donate clothes, other tools or food to an NGO helping Roma families in need".

Collective action intentions were measured by four items based on van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach (2004), for example: "I would participate in an event (e.g. a demonstration on the street) on behalf of Roma rights.".

Perceived efficacy was measured by two items: "Roma and non-Roma people together can change the situation of the Roma.",,I think the Roma and their allies are able to change the situation of the Roma." *For the questions we used as part of an omnibus survey study, see Appendix C.*

Results

Descriptive statistics. Privilege and disadvantage awareness, donation intentions and collective action intentions were low in the sample, they were all under the midpoint. The correlation between disadvantage awareness and behavioral intentions were stronger than between privilege awareness and behavioral intentions. *For descriptives and correlations, see Table 7.*

Table 7

Descriptive statistics and correlations of Study 3

	α/r (in case of two items)	Mean	SD	Correlation			
				1	2	3	4
1. Donation intention	.854	3.10	1.80	1	.665**	.484**	.272**
2. Collective action intention	.891	2.50	1.52		1	.544**	.351**
3. Disadvantage awareness	.680	3.14.	1.88			1	.556**
4. Privilege awareness	.874	2.89	1.81				1

Linear regression. We conducted regression analyses to see how strong predictors disadvantage and privilege awareness are for each action intention. In case of collective action intention, ($F(2, 1004) = 214.76$, $p < .001$) disadvantage awareness explained 29.6 % of the variance ($R^2 = 0.29$), and together with privilege awareness, it increased only to 30% (R2 = 0.29). Privilege awareness was only a marginally significant predictor for collective action intention *For the regression table for collective action intention, see Table 8.*

Table 8

Regression model for collective action intention

Variable	B	S. E.	Beta	t	p	CI (95%)
Constant	1.04	.09		12.28	< .001	.87,1.21
Disadvantage awareness	.41	.03	.51	9.15	< .001	.36, .46
Privilege awareness	.06	.03	.07	2.19	.029	.01,.11

In terms of donation intention, only disadvantage awareness was a significant predictor that explained 23.4% of the variance ($R^2 = 0.23$), and privilege awareness was a non- significant predictor, it was therefore excluded from the model. *For the model, see Table 9.*

Table 9

Regression model for donation intention (privilege awareness was a non-significant predictor, therefore excluded from the model)

Variable	B	S. E.	Beta	t	p	CI (95%)
Constant	1.65	.10		11.17	<.001	1.46, 1.84
Disadvantage awareness	.46	.03	.48	17.53	<.001	.41, 51

Moderation analysis. Efficacy significantly moderated the effect of privilege awareness on collective action intention ($F(3,1003) = 108\ .65$; $p < .001$). Efficacy was also a significant moderator of privilege awareness on donation intention ($F(3,1003) =$

122.28; $p < .001$). The higher perceived efficacy was, the stronger the connection between privilege awareness and behavior intentions was. *Simple slopes for the two analysis are demonstrated in Figure 3 and 4.*



Figure 3. Simple slope plot on the connection between privilege awareness and collective action intention at different levels of the moderator, perceived efficacy.



Figure 4. Simple slope plot on the connection between privilege awareness and donation intention at different levels of the moderator, perceived efficacy.

Discussion of Study 3

As we expected based on the findings of the pilot study and Study 1, cross-sectional survey data supported the hypothesis that privilege awareness had limited connection to behavioral intentions, whereas disadvantage awareness was a strong predictor of both collective action and donation intentions. Also, in line with our hypothesis, efficacy beliefs moderated the effect of privilege on action intention: the relation was stronger among those who had high perceived efficacy to bring about social change. This demonstrated the importance of efficacy beliefs: privilege awareness could only convey its effect on behavior in the presence of high efficacy beliefs.

Our findings shed some light on the limitations of our experimental design. The original study of Powell and colleagues (2007) built on the existing awareness of privilege in society that could be made salient experimentally. In contrast, as we demonstrated with correlational data, privilege is less endorsed in Hungarian society, the scale had a low mean, and it did predict behavioral intentions. Disadvantage awareness on the other hand, was a stronger predictor of action intentions, underlying our assumption that acknowledgement of outgroup disadvantage is higher among the non-Roma majority in Hungary that privilege awareness.

Discussion of privilege awareness studies

Our experimental studies did not demonstrate a clear difference in the perception of privilege and disadvantage, as the original studies conducted by Power et al. (2007) suggested based on findings in the US in the White and Black American intergroup context. Instead, they revealed the ambivalence how participants acknowledged injustice when they were instructed to do so, but resisted attitude change or show related action intentions. Open-ended questions of the pilot study indicated that most participants did not deny outgroup disadvantage and the low status of the Roma compared to the majority group, and they recognized it as a problem, indicated a need for social change, but they justified their negative attitudes by reporting bad contact experience and low perceived efficacy about change. We even identified a backlash effect: a number of participants expressed their frustration by criticizing the study and justifying their prejudiced attitudes in response to the treatment conditions.

In Study 1, we found evidence that attitudes toward the Roma were more hostile compared to other outgroups (including relations to the poor, and the poorly educated that are overlapping categories both in real-life, but especially in the general perception of Roma people as poor and uneducated). Participants had less warm feelings toward the Roma, and attributed more responsibility to the Roma compared to the other out-groups. At the same time, participants were aware of the fact that the most beneficial form of support was autonomy-oriented help, and identified it as the most efficient form in relationt to the Roma as well. Despite this awareness, they were not affected in their emotions (guilt or sympathy) by the manipulations, and their collective action intentions were not influenced either. Emotions actually had strong correlations with action intentions on the sample, but the manipulation of injustice framing did not have an impact on them.

Disadvantage manipulation led to a limited change in responsibility attribution compared to the control condition. Study 2 provided an explanation to that by highlighting that disadvantage awareness is more strongly related to behavioral intentions than privilege awareness. Privilege can mobilize people only in the presence of high perceived efficacy. If majority members see no possibility for change, they might justify the status differences, instead of wanting to change it (Stewart et al., 2012). The presence of cognitive alternatives is key for social change (Tajfel, 1978),

therefore in its absence members of the majority may refrain from taking action to change the intergroup situation.

We found that privilege awareness, or the salience of intergroup injustice can either motivate collective action or on the contrary, it can demobilize people and even cause backlash, depending on the level of hostility embedded in the intergroup situation (Shnabel et al., 2017). Therefore, another difference in the intergroup context of Roma – non-Roma relations vs. White and African Americans was that in the US it is modern racism that stops people from engaging in ally action (Powell et al., 2005) as opposed to open hostility. The hostility of the intergroup situation and the lack of expectations to act in non-prejudiced ways can offer an explanation as to why disadvantage framing was more strongly related to ally action intentions than privilege framing, and why we found a resistance (in the form of a backlash effect) to any type of framing.

Based on our mixed results that are inconsistent with previous research we conclude that the normative social context and specificities of the intergroup situation play an important role in the influence of injustice appraisals on attitude and behavior. In the US context, self-focused privilege raised guilt and awareness, a connection that we found neither in an openly hostile intergroup context (Roma versus non-Roma), nor in a less hostile intergroup relation (based on respondents' personal choice) in Hungary. These findings suggested that besides the specific intergroup context, the broader societal context matters too. Majority participants in Hungary reacted with more distance, or even reactance to explicit statements of privilege and disadvantage. The identified backlash effects suggested that confrontation was threatening to participants, and they were motivated to justify their existing ambivalent or negative attitudes and inaction.

We have to consider reactance as an issue when designing intervention methods to reduce prejudice or induce political mobilization for social change among Hungarian participants, especially when intervention focuses on ingroup responsibility. However, we did find more flexibility in the perception of outgroup responsibility: participants were more willing to acknowledge outgroup disadvantage, and this was a much stronger predictor of action intentions. In line with this, sympathy seemed to be a stronger predictor of action intentions than guilt. This leaves us with the message that interventions have to address dimensions where resistance of the majority is weaker, and this is connected to the other-focus rather than self-focus. The prescence of explicit

prejudice and the lack of ingroup responsibility and perceived efficacy stops majority participants from involvement.

However, disadvantage awareness and sympathy seemed to be the „low-threshold" motivators of solidarity toward marginalized groups in a hostile context. Despite the fact that mobilization and allyship are atypical and rare in Hungarian society, it is a crucial question what can bring majority members closer to these attitudes, and what the most important barriers are in this process. Open confrontation with own responsibility seems to be counterproductive but highlighting outgroup disadvantage and questioning outgroup responsibility in its low status could be a first step.

Intergroup emotions and their relation to different forms of allyship[1]

[1] To the writing of this chapter, not only my supervisor, Dr. Anna Kende, but Dr. Julia Becker (University of Osnabrück) and Prof. Craig McGarty (Western Sydney University) contributed with their comments. Julia Becker also provided me the German data I could use in Study 5b.

"Refugees don't need your pity." (Badkhen, 2016). "Integrate refugees with help, not pity." (De Gruyter, 2016) "Don't feel sorry for refugees—believe in them" (Mufleh, 2017). These headlines suggest that feeling sorry for someone is an inappropriate and paternalistic emotion toward refugees. It seems that when it comes to engagement in action, refugees and advocates of refugee rights consider that feeling sorry is both inadequate and unwanted. However, the absence of feeling sorry – for example in the title "Why I can't feel pity for the Syrian refugees in Europe" (Ziffer, 2015) – more directly refers to a negative attitude toward refugees, suggesting that they deserve harsher treatment. However, there is no scientific evidence thus far suggesting that to feel sorry can be adequate to initiate social change action in some intergroup situations, specifically in contexts where inequalities are high both in a socio-economic and in a political sense. Therefore, we investigate the question whether feeling sorry for a disadvantaged outgroup can motivate collective action in some cases.

Allyship in the form of collective action and donation

Ally action can be defined as collective action that is conducted in political solidarity (Becker, 2012). The classic understanding of collective action refers to activism in the form of political protests, such as signing petitions or participating in demonstrations with the goal of social change (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). Collective action in this sense is depicted as the most "ideal" form of prosocial action (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006). In contrast, donation is often regarded as a problematic form of intergroup behavior because it has little social change potential or in fact it can contribute to maintaining the status quo (Thomas & McGarty, 2017).

However, donations and political action were mostly studied separately, and in connection with different intergroup contexts (for a summary see Kende, 2016). Studies about ally collective action mainly focused on movements on behalf of disadvantaged groups that suffered injustices in different areas of social life (for example being targets of prejudice and discrimination), but they did not necessarily face disadvantage in economic terms, (see for example sexual minorities or Blacks in the US, who are diverse in socio-economic status [SES]). In contrast, studies on volunteerism and donations focused mostly on groups that face not only political disadvantages (i.e., in the area of political rights) but economic disadvantages. Such groups are, for instance, the poor, homeless people or victims of humanitarian crises (e.g., Thomas et al., 2012;

Thomas et al., 2016). To alleviate their suffering, both social change oriented collective action and economic donations are relevant forms of cross-group pro-social action. Furthermore, the distinction is even less straightforward if we take into account that these two forms of intergroup behaviors coexist: those who are involved in activist type of support, are usually also active in benevolent support (Thomas & McGarty, 2016).

A study about the motivations of refugee helpers in Hungary at the peak of refugee crisis in 2015 revealed that political action and volunteerism are closely connected, and have a shared motivational background, specifically the same moral convictions predicted both types of pro-social behaviors (Kende, Lantos, Belinszky, Csaba, & Lukács, 2017). These results suggest that both types of actions, activist and benevolent type of support are important tools of an ally on behalf of such economically disadvantaged groups.

Feeling sorry and outraged as motivators of collective action

The direct reaction to the disadvantage is typically connected to pity or sympathy, while the political stance against injustice is connected to outrage or anger (Thomas & McGarty, 2017). As the co-occurrence of similar emotions (empathy and anger) was found to predict collective action previously (Selvanathan et al., 2017), we argue that in the case of social groups that are low in SES and social status, prosocial emotions like sympathy and pity can motivate ally behaviors of both donation and collective action, as these forms of behavior are expected to be intertwined in the case of economic and political marginalization. In line with this, sorry and donations are less relevant for not economically, but socially and politically disadvantaged minorities (e.g. sexual minorities). Based on the capacity of prosocial emotions to predict collective action (Fingerhut, 2011; Selvanathan et al., 2017), we argue that sorry toward a marginalized group can be a predictor of both types of action intentions: giving type of behavior, like donation and acting kind of behavior, like collective action (Thomas & McGarty, 2017).

Research on the emotional motivation of collective action have used various terms to describe prosocial emotions. Pity, sympathy and empathy were differentiated in some studies, referring either to the more positive implications of sympathy on action intentions compared to pity (Leach et al., 2002), or to the higher level of identification with and mobilization for the outgroup in case of empathy, in contrast to sympathy (Thomas et al., 2009).

Still, in many cases, pity, sympathy, and empathy were used interchangeably (Boler, 1997; Iyer et al., 2003; Wispé, 1986). Differentiation is hard because emotions are not "natural kinds" in the sense that biologically determined, but more a result of subjective categorization (Barrett, 2006). These emotion words (e.g., sympathy, pity, compassion) have slightly different meanings, moreover they have different connotations in different languages, embedded in cultural contexts (Frijda, Markam, Sato, & Wiers, 1995; Russell, 1991).

Therefore, we decided to use an umbrella term, feeling sorry, to describe these prosocial emotions. Our decision was influenced by the fact that feeling sorry does not have the negative connotation of pity, and it does not have a reference to high identification like empathy, therefore, it can capture advantaged group members' prosocial emotion in response to the suffering of a disadvantaged group. Furthermore, our goal in the present research was not to look at the differences between specific prosocial emotions, but to compare the role of feeling sorry to the role of outrage in mobilization within specific intergroup contexts.

Collective action on behalf of economically marginalized groups

Activist support is a relatively rare phenomenon (Thomas, & McGarty, 2017), especially on behalf of marginalized groups, who are targets of open hostility. For example, introducing a criminalizing law against homeless people in Hungary did not result in widescale opposition of citizens, only a small demonstration of intellectuals (Koncz, 2018). It is harder to gain the support of allies for causes that divide society, and to groups that are targets of open prejudice. These groups face structural disadvantages and discrimination, therefore responsibility taken by majority members who possess resources and influence political decisions is crucial. The involvement of majority members as allies is indispensable for achieving social change (see Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2010; Thomas, McGarty, Reese, Berndsen, & Bliuc, 2016).

Action intentions are dependent on the appraisal of and emotions toward specific target groups. We focus on both economically and politically disadvantaged groups: these groups suffer both economic deprivation (such as a lower SES, lack of resources, poor housing and health conditions), and political disadvantages (such as violation of their rights, discrimination, and lack of respect). More theories suggest that such type of groups evoke specific emotions and action tendencies. These groups in need of help can be characterized by "passive deviance", which means that they are perceived as

vulnerable (for example, in case of economic refugees) (Alphen, Dijker, Bos, van den Borne, & Curfs, 2011). The more serious the perceived disadvantage of the group is perceived, the more prosocial emotion is evoked by the advantaged (Dijker & Koomen, 2010). The theory of vulnerability-based morality states that appraisal of vulnerability based on cues by the target group and the specific context then typically leads to moral emotions of sympathy, which induces an evolutionary developed care mechanism to support the group by any possible means (Dijker, 2001; Dijker, 2014).

Similarly, the BIAS map of the stereotype content model (Cuddy et al., 2007) relates groups of low competence and high warmth to pity and helping behavior in specific circumstances. Target groups stereotyped by low SES (e.g. welfare recipients, poor people) tend to appear in the low competence cluster, as opposed to target groups with high SES (for example LGBTQI people, migrant workers, Arabs) that tend to appear in the high competence cluster (Fiske et al., 2002). We expect that feeling sorry by advantaged group members may be an indicator of warmth and lack of prejudice, therefore this emotional response is a supportive reaction to the unjustly harsh situation of the group that is otherwise perceived in a hostile way (a stereotype content of low warmth and low competence).

Advantaged groups can show support for marginalized groups by fulfilling their daily needs in the form of donations, volunteerism, or charitable acts and also by engaging in political action as allies to help them gain political recognition, fight injustices, and achieve change in the intergroup status quo. In such situations, the dichotomy between benevolent and activist support (Thomas & McGarty, 2017) are blurred because motivations of alleviating the suffering of the disadvantaged group and fighting the structural injustice can co-exist among supporters, especially when social injustices further increase the economic marginalization of the outgroup (Becker, Ksenofontov, Siem, & Love, 2018; Kende, Lantos, Belinszky, Csaba, & Lukács, 2017). In these contexts, low SES, economically and politically disadvantaged groups can be equally dependent on material help and the representation of their social and political interests.

We argue that in the case of social groups that are both politically disadvantaged and low in SES, feeling sorry can be an adequate emotional response to the suffering of the outgroup that can motivate ally behaviors both in the form of donation and collective action. However, prosocial emotions are expected to be less central in mobilization for collective action in case of higher SES groups that are politically

disadvantaged. For example, empathy was not a significant mediator between intergroup contact and ally collective action for LGBT people (Fingerhut, 2011).

We propose that feeling sorry and giving donations are less relevant compared to outrage for politically, but not economically disadvantaged minorities (e.g. sexual minorities), as these groups are perceived as less vulnerable, more competent and agentic based on their higher socio-economic status.

Hypotheses

We focused on the role of feeling sorry in predicting different behavioral intentions (i.e. donation and collective action), along with the classic mobilizing emotion of outrage.

We had the following predictions (visually presented in Figure 5):

1. Injustice awareness about economically marginalized groups predicts both outrage and sorry.
2. Feeling sorry predicts both donation and collective action intentions, while outrage predicts collective action intentions.
3. Emotions mediate the effect of injustice awareness on behavioral intentions.
4. Feeling sorry does not predict donation and collective action intentions in case of groups that are not socio-economically marginalized (for example, gay people).



Figure 5. Hypothesized mediation model predicting donation and collective action intentions toward marginalized groups.

Overview of the Studies

As most studies were conducted in North American or Western European contexts, we tested our research question in an Eastern and Western European context. In Study 1 we conducted a survey in Hungary related to the Roma minority. In Study 2a, we aimed to replicate our findings in connection with refugees in Germany, that is a similarly marginalized group as the Roma in Hungary. In Study 2b, we replicated Study 2a with refugees in the Hungarian context. In Study 3, we contrasted our models to an intergroup context that is not connected to economic disadvantage, but political disadvantage (gay people), therefore feeling sorry was expected to be much less relevant predictor. Finally, in Study 4, we used an experimental method and tested the role of feeling sorry in ally collective action on behalf of an economically versus a politically disadvantaged fictitious group.

Study 4

Roma people are targets of marginalization and discrimination (Feischmidt, Szombati, & Szuhay, 2013; Fraser, 1995), they experience high level of poverty and unemployment, low level of education, and face demographic and institutional

segregation (Farkas, 2014). Anti-Roma prejudice is widespread and blatantly expressed against them (Kende, Hadarics, & Lášticová, 2017). The situation of Roma people is therefore both a human rights and an economic issue that needs to be addressed simultaneously.

Because of the deeply rooted structural disadvantages that this group experiences, allies are important to fulfill both their material and political needs. Advantaged group members with the intention to improve the situation of the Roma can therefore find both donations and collective action as adequate responses to this particular intergroup context. In this context, holding positive attitudes, and engaging in pro-social action on behalf of the Roma is counter-normative and highly politicized.

Method

Participants and Procedure. We conducted an online survey in 2016 as part of an omnibus research in Hungary (N = 1007). Participants were recruited online at our request by a survey company using a multiple-step, proportionally stratified, probabilistic sampling method of an online participant pool resulting in a sample demographically similar to the Hungarian population in terms of age, gender, level of education, and type of settlement. We did not conduct sample size calculations based on a priori estimations of effect size, but targeted N = 1000 that is typically used in opinion poll surveys relying on representative samples of Hungarian society (for the accuracy of estimating election results in Hungary using different sample sizes see Poll of polls, 2018).

Fifty-one percent of participants were women, their average age was 41.5, with a standard deviation of 13 years. Thirty-nine percent of participants had a degree in higher education, 46.1 % had finished secondary school, 2.9% had not finished secondary school and 11.6 % chose the "other" option. 19% lived in Budapest, 54% lived in smaller towns, and 27% in a village.

We conducted all the statistical analysis using IBM SPSS version 22.0 and AMOS (Arbuckle, 2011). We report all measures and data exclusions related to the research question. We conducted the studies with the IRB approval of *anonymous* University. Authors confirm that the manuscript adheres to ethical guidelines specified in the APA Code of Conduct as well as author's national ethics guidelines.[2]

[2] This includes requirements that research is conducted ethically, results are reported honestly, the submitted work is original and not (self-)plagiarized, and authorship reflects individuals' contributions. The authors

Measures. In all measures 7-point Likert type- scales were used (from 1 = Completely disagree to 7 = Completely agree), unless otherwise indicated. The list of all items are presented in the Appendix. Injustice awareness was measured by two items, for example: *"Members of the Roma minority are disadvantaged in terms of their rights, compared to the Hungarian majority"*. Each emotion was measured by a single item in the following way: "*If you think of the situation of Roma in Hungary, to what extent do you feel the following emotions? Sorry; Outrage"***.**

Donation intentions were measured by two items, for example: *"I would donate clothes, other tools or food to an NGO helping Roma families in need".* Collective action intentions were measured by 4 items based on van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach (2004), for example: "*I would participate in an event (e.g. a demonstration on the street) on behalf of Roma rights."*). The language of the questionnaire was Hungarian.

Results

Descriptive statistics. Injustice awareness, sorry, outrage, donation intentions and collective action intentions were low. These results suggest the overall presence of negative attitudes toward the Roma. All the variables were correlated with a medium to large effect size, except for the correlation between outrage and donation intentions that was nonsignificant. For scale reliabilities, means and correlations between variables, see Table 1.

Hypothesis testing. To check the connection between (a) injustice awareness (b) emotions, and (c) behavioral intentions, we used path analysis in AMOS (Arbuckle, 2011). For a visual presentation of our results see *Figure 6*.

declare that there are no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Data accessibility will be ensured in a repository of the osf.io website.



Figure 6. Predictors of collective action and donation intentions toward the Roma in Hungary in Study 4.

We applied the model building – model trimming technique (see e.g. Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014). We used this method because we assumed that all paths would be significant, except for the path between outrage and donation intentions. The original saturated model shows a perfect fit with $\chi 2$ and RMSEA values of 0, and NFI and CFI values of 1. To test the mediated effects of injustice awareness on collective action and donation intentions, we used our saturated model as a base and trimmed the non-significant pathway between outrage and donation (B = -0.04; SE = 0.026; p = .105; β = −.05). The resulting trimmed model, illustrated in *Figure 2*, still showed good fit to our data ($\chi 2$ = 2.62; df = 1, CFI = .999, NFI = .998, RMSEA = .040). This model indicated that injustice awareness was a stronger predictor of sorry (B = 0.55; SE = .027; p < .001; β = .54) than of outrage (B = 0.27; SE = 0.032; p < .001; β = .25). Furthermore, injustice awareness was directly connected to both collective action intentions (B = 0.29; SE = 0.024; p < .001; β = .36) and donation intentions (B = 0.26; SE = 0.030; p < .001; β = .26). Sorry was even stronger (B = 0.23; SE = 0.025; p < .001; β = .28) predictor of collective action than outrage (B = 0.09; SE = 0.018; p < .001; β =

.12). Donation intention was predicted only by sorry (B = 0.39; SE = 0.030; $p < .001$; β = .40). Sorry and outrage had a positive connection (β = .34; $p < .001$); and collective action intentions and donation intentions as well (β = .48; $p < .001$).

We tested whether sorry and outrage mediate the effect of injustice awareness on donation and collective action intentions. To reveal these indirect relationships, a mediation analysis was conducted with the bootstrapping technique suggested by Macho and Ledermann (2011), where we requested 95% confidence intervals using 2000 re-samples. Indeed, the mediation analysis showed that injustice awareness had a significant indirect effect on collective action intentions through both sorry (B = 0.12, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.10, .16]) and outrage (B =0.03, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.02, .04]). Injustice awareness also had an indirect effect on donation intentions via sorry (B=*0*.21, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.18, .26]). As direct effects between variables remained significant in all paths, we have only partial mediations in the model.

Discussion of Study 4

Our first hypothesis that injustice awareness predicts both outrage and sorry, was supported. Our second hypothesis that sorry predicts donation intentions, and outrage predicts collective action intentions, was also supported. Emotions mediated the effect of injustice awareness on behavioral intentions. Finally, the positive connection between outrage and sorry, and between collective action and donation intentions suggests that the emotions and the actions were closely related. Surprisingly, sorry was an even stronger predictor of collective action intentions than outrage.

Study 5

In Study 5, we intended to replicate these findings in connection with another marginalized group both in terms of status and political rights: refugees in Germany and in Hungary. Refugees, similarly to the Roma, are targets of open prejudice: a high level of anti-immigrant prejudice was measured in many European countries (see e.g. Osborne, 2016; von der Mark, 2016). According to the European Social Survey, Muslims are the most rejected migrant group in all European countries (Heath & Richards, 2016).

Refugees travelling across Europe, need the assistance of volunteers to fulfill their basic needs for resources and safety, but they also need the political support in the representation of their interests. Refugees face multiple disadvantages in Europe, such

as the language barrier, the lack of documents of professional education, the lack of accepted qualifications, and lack of relevant work experience (Trines, 2017). Apart from the socio-economic disadvantages, refugees have an uncertain legal status, even with a constant threat of deportation (Mortimer, 2016). Despite the clear indication of an increase in hostility toward immigrants, the pro-refugee movement underlines that some people are willing to engage in pro-social action on behalf of refugees, in the forms of donations and volunteering, or engaging in political activism (Hamann & Karakayali, 2016).

Relying on a German sample in Study 5a allowed us to improve the generalizability of our finding by looking at a different societal context in which pro-social intentions were more widespread and normative (Gerő, Messing, & Ságvári, 2015; Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011). The official policy regarding refugees in Germany was mostly accepting at the onset of the refugee crisis in 2015, and pro-refugee volunteers acted in line with dominant social norms of the country (Verkaik, 2017). The official German policy was rather hospitable compared to other European countries, especially countries of Eastern Europe. For example, the Hungarian government was openly inhospitable and engaged in an ongoing anti-immigrant campaign from 2015. In Study 5b our goal was to replicate 5a with a representative sample in the Hungarian context. Given the different sampling strategies our focus here is on comparing relationships not mean levels of responses and we advise caution in making these direct comparisons.

Method

Participants and Procedure. Data were collected in Germany in 2016 by an online survey using convenience sampling (N = 191). Fifty percent of participants were women, the average age of the participants was 36.9, with a standard deviation of 14 years. Participants' level of education was secondary school degree: 43.5 %, university degree: 38.2 %, while 17.6% did not respond interpretably to this question. The sample size was suboptimal for a path model, as the optimal number of participants is determined as being higher than 200 (Kline, 2011). However, others suggest that 10:1 ratio of cases to free parameters is acceptable (Bentler & Chou, 1987), especially in cases of simple models, as the one we test. Besides, we had to work with the available data collected at one time point, as the changing political situation of refugees and the

changing policies regarding refugees did not allow an extended data collection. Therefore, conclusions drawn from this study need to be interpreted carefully.

In Study 5b we conducted an online survey as part of an omnibus research in Hungary, relying on a sample recruited with an identical method as in Study 1, however it was randomly split and the other half or respondents completed a different survey. Therefore, we ended up using $N = 563$ in this study. 51.7% of participants were women, their average age was 41.5, with a standard deviation of 13 years. 34.3% of participants had a degree in higher education, 62.7 % finished secondary school, 3% had not finished secondary school. 16.3 % lived in Budapest, 54.9 % lived in smaller towns, and 29.1% in a village and 0.7 % lived abroad.

Measures. Injustice awareness was measured by five items, for example *"The way refugees are treated in Germany/Hungary is unfair."* out of which one *("I think the German/Hungarian refugee policy intensifies the problem of social injustice.")* was omitted because of low reliability. Again, emotions of sorry and outrage were measured with single items: "*If I think of refugees in Germany/Hungary, I have a feeling of sorry."* Donation intention was measured by three items, for example: *„Donate money to an organization supporting refugees."* Collective action intention was measured by reacting to the following scenario: "*Imagine that a great number of refugees have to move to your neighborhood. What is the likelihood that you would participate in the following actions?*" Four items of collective action were used, for example: *"Demonstrations demanding more rights for refugees"*. The response scale in all measures ranged from 1 = I do not agree at all, to 7 = I completely agree. For the list of items, see the Appendix. The language of the questionnaire in Study 5a was German, and in Study 5b it was Hungarian.

Results of Study 5a

Descriptive statistics. Injustice awareness, and sorry were close to the midpoint of the scale; while donation intentions and collective action intentions were low. Outrage about the refugee policy was high in the sample. Results showed that all elements of the model were significantly correlated, but outrage was an exception. It was only negatively correlated with sorry ($r = -.23$; $p < .001$), but it was not associated with any other variables. For scale reliabilities, means, and correlations see Table 2.

Hypothesis testing.

Again, we used the model trimming method. For a visual presentation of the results, see *Figure 7*.



Figure 7. Predictors of collective action and donation intentions toward refugees in Germany in Study 5a.

We found that outrage had no significant connections in the model, so we trimmed the non-significant pathways between injustice awareness and outrage (*B* = 0.09; *SE* = 0.085; *p* = .317; β = .07), outrage and collective action intentions (*B* = 0.04; *SE* = 0.044; p = .414; β = .02), and outrage and donation intentions (*B* =0.05; *SE* = 0.043; p = .105; β = .05). The only significant but negative connection was found between outrage and sorry (β = -.34; *p* < .001). The resulting trimmed model, illustrated in Figure 3, still showed good fit to our data ($\chi 2$ = 2.621; df = 3, CFI = 1, NFI = .995, RMSEA = .000).

Injustice awareness was connected to both collective action intentions (*B* = 0.82; *SE* = 0.060; *p* < .001; β = .66) and donation intentions (*B* = 0.42; *SE* = 0.058; *p* < .001; β = .39). Injustice awareness was a strong predictor of sorry (*B* = 0.72; *SE* = 0.066; *p* < .001; β = .60), and sorry was a stronger predictor of donation intention (*B* = 0.45; *SE* = 0.048; *p* < .001; β = .51) than of collective action intentions (*B* = 0.27; *SE* = 0.050; *p* < .001; β = .26). Sorry and outrage have a negative connection (β = -.34; *p* < .001); and

collective action intentions and donation intentions have a positive connection (β = .28; $p < .001$).

We tested the mediating role of sorry with the same bootstrapping method as reported in Study 1. Mediation analysis showed that injustice awareness was mediated by sorry in its effects on both donation intentions ($B = 0.33$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.25, .43]) and on collective action intentions ($B = 0.20$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.12, .28]). Again, we identified partial mediations.

Results of Study 5b

Descriptive statistics. All elements of the model were significantly correlated. The correlation between injustice awareness and sorry was strong, as the correlation between sorry and behavioral outcomes, too. The connection between outrage and behavioral outcomes were weaker. For scale reliabilities, means and correlations between variables, see Table 3.

Hypothesis testing. The procedure was identical to the previous studies. For a visual presentation of our results see *Figure 8*.



Figure 8. Predictors of collective action and donation intentions toward refugees in Hungary in Study 5b.

There was no significant connection between outrage and collective action intentions (*B* =0.03; *SE* = 0.02; *p* = .202; β =.04). After trimming the non-significant paths, the model still showed good fit to our data ($\chi 2$ = 2.63; df = 2, CFI =1, NFI =.99, RMSEA = .024).

Injustice awareness was connected to both collective action intentions (*B* =0.44, *SE* = 0.04; *p* < .001; β =.45) and donation intentions (*B* =0.57, *SE* = 0.04; *p* < .001; β = .48). Sorry was a predictor of both donation intentions (*B* = 0.39, *SE* = 0.03; *p* < .001; β = .43) and collective action intentions (*B* = 0.25, *SE* = 0.03; *p* < .001; β = .34). Sorry and outrage had a positive connection (*B* = 0.35, SE= 0.10 *p* < .001; β = .15); and collective action intentions and donation intentions also had a positive connection (B =0.48, SE= 0.04 p < .001; β = .52).

We tested the mediating role of sorry with the same bootstrapping method as reported before. Injustice awareness was mediated by sorry in its effects on both donation intentions (B = 0.322, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.302, .342]) and on collective action intentions (*B* = 0.209, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.191, .228]).

Discussion of Study 5

In Study 5a, we replicated the pattern regarding sorry we found in Study 4. The connection between injustice awareness and sorry was supported, and injustice awareness was mediated by sorry in its effect on behavioral intentions. The results confirmed our prediction that sorry would predict collective action in the German context, too. This strengthens our assumption that in case of both economically and socially/politically marginalized groups, sorry can play an important role in pro-social action.

However, outrage had entirely different connections with other variables than in Study 4. Outrage had a connection neither with injustice awareness, nor with collective action intention. The most feasible explanation for this is the differences between the normative contexts of the two studies, as the item measuring outrage ("If I think of refugee policy in Germany, I have a feeling of outrage") could be interpreted in different ways in the German context. People could perceive the policies both too supportive (in line with an anti-refugee opinion), or not supportive enough (in line with a pro-refugee opinion).

In Study 5b, injustice awareness was connected to both outrage and sorry. Outrage was connected to injustice awareness, indicating that outrage about refugee policy in Hungary reflected a pro-refugee stand among respondents. Despite this,

outrage did not have a connection to collective action intentions, only sorry predicted donation and collective action.

These results underline the greater importance of sorry compared to outrage in connection with refugees in both contexts. Feeling sorry toward a group that is generally the target of open hostility, was a more important predictor of action intentions than the politicized emotion of outrage. Outrage and collective action were strongly correlated in previous studies (Haidt, 2003; Leach et al., 2002; Thomas & McGarty, 2009), where the target groups were socially and politically disadvantaged, but not necessarily economically deprived. We suggest that feeling sorry expressed the acknowledgement of the needs of these economically deprived groups that led to donation and collective action intentions. We nevertheless contend that the function of outrage and sorry remains different for groups that are only socially and politically disadvantaged, but do not suffer economic hardships. In this case, outrage is expected to play a more important role in predicting behavioral intentions.

Study 6

The goal of Study 6 was to test whether the revealed pattern that feeling sorry mediates the connection between injustice awareness and both collective actions and donations was indeed only relevant in connection with groups that are marginalized both in an economic and in a political sense. We did not expect sorry to be a relevant emotion in response to social and political disadvantage. Therefore, we tested our model in connection with gay people, a socially and politically disadvantaged, but economically not uniformly disadvantaged social group (McGarrity, & Huebner, 2013). Sexual minorities, similarly to the Roma and refugees, are targets of social and political disadvantage connected to prejudice and discrimination (Calcagno, 2016; Mallett et al., 2008). However, as they are not (necessarily) disadvantaged in an economic sense, they do not need economic donations. Therefore sorry, a reaction to the group's suffering may be less relevant than outrage in predicting collective action intentions. In fact, sorry may express undesirable paternalistic attitudes that hinder political action intentions. In line with this, we also expected that donations would be less relevant than for both economically and politically marginalized groups. In line with this, we altered our predictions of the model in relation to support for gay people.

1. Injustice awareness predicts outrage more strongly than sorry.

2. Outrage predicts collective action intentions, but not donation intentions, while sorry has no significant connection to donation and collective action intentions.

Method

Participants and Procedure. A large university student sample was used in Hungary, where students received course credit for participation (N = 475). 76.2 % of participants were women, their average age was 21.06, with a standard deviation of 2.2 years.

Measures. Measures were identical to those used in Study 4. All the measures were tailored to the group of gay people. We are keenly aware that the category "gay people" appears very restrictive in English and does not involve many sexual minorities. We decided to use the term "melegek" which is the most commonly applied label in the Hungarian language for sexual minorities in everyday language and it is the term used in official publications, in the name of national NGOs, in the name of a hotline for gay people and other sexual minorities.

Injustice awareness items remained the same, exchanging the word refugee to gay people (4 items, α = .90). As one of the donation items ("*Donate clothing, school supplies or toys*") may have been insulting to gay people, given the Hungarian context that restricts options for gay people to raise children, we used only the other two items (r = .85, p < .001).

From the collective action items, we exchanged "*Preventing deportation of refugees* " to the item "*I would raise my voice for gay people*." (4 items, α = .95).

Results

Descriptive statistics. All elements of the model were significantly correlated, but the effect size of the connection between sorry and behavioral outcomes were smaller, compared to the connection between outrage and behavioral outcomes. For scale reliabilities, means and correlations, see Table 4.

Hypothesis testing. The procedure was identical to the previous studies. For a visual presentation of our results see *Figure 9*.



Figure 9. Predictors of collective action and donation intentions toward gay people in Hungary in Study 6.

Unlike the previous models, there were no significant connections between sorry and donation intentions, so we trimmed the non-significant pathway between sorry and donation (*B* = 0.07; *SE* = 0.04; p = .062; β = .08). The resulting trimmed model showed good fit to our data ($\chi 2$ = 36.85; df = 1, CFI = .99, NFI =.99, RMSEA = .069).

Injustice awareness was connected to both collective action intentions (*B* =0.73; *SE* = 0.05; *p* < .001; β =.60) and donation intentions (*B* =0.48; *SE* = 0.06; *p* < .001; β = .42). Outrage was a predictor of both donation intention (*B* = 0.24; *SE* = 0.05; *p* < .001; β = .25) and collective action intentions (*B* = 0.23; *SE* = 0.04; *p* < .001; β = .23). There was a weak connection between sorry and collective action intentions (*B* = 0.05; *SE* = 0.02; *p* = .033; β =.05). Sorry and outrage had a positive connection (*B* = 0.58; *SE* = 0.10 *p* < .001; β = .26); as collective action intentions and donation intentions, too (*B* = 0.96; SE= 0.08 *p* < .001; β = .65).

Mediation analysis showed that injustice awareness was mediated by outrage in its effects on both donation intentions (*B* = 0.193, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.167, .219]) and on collective action intentions (*B* = 0.187, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.164, .211]). Injustice

awareness was also mediated by sorry on collective action intentions ($B = 0.113$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.096, .129]).

Discussion of Study 6

As expected, in the case of gay people as an outgroup, outrage had a stronger connection with the behavioral intentions than sorry. Surprisingly, outrage was not only a predictor of collective action intentions, but also of donation intentions, while this connection was not present in the models of marginalized groups of Study 4 and 5. The explanation could be connected to the strong correlation between collective action intentions and donation intentions, so outrage in response to injustice awareness mediated both forms of actions, as prosocial intentions. Injustice awareness had a weaker connection to sorry and sorry did not predict donation intentions. However, sorry had a very weak but still significant connection to collective action intentions, similarly to all the previous models. This suggests that sorry is not necessarily linked exclusively to donation intentions, as the two forms of action are intertwined, and simply reflects a positive (rather than negative) emotional response to the group.

We still found a contrast between the intergroup contexts of economically disdvantaged groups with low SES versus politically disadvantaged groups, as in the latter case, outrage was a stronger predictor of donation and collective action intentions than sorry. In the case of economically and politically marginalized groups, the opposite was true: sorry had a stronger relationship with behavioral intentions than outrage.

Study 7

In studies 4, 5 and 6 we examined the connection between feeling sorry and outrage and collective action intentions related to groups that were both economically and politically disadvantaged vs. groups that are only politically disadvantaged using cross-sectional survey data. The strength of our surveys was that we measured attitudes and action intentions toward real, existing groups in different intergroup contexts ensuring high external validity. We relied on the assumption that perceived socio-economic status is a meaningful difference when it comes to feeling sorry in mobilization. However, we did not directly measure whether the difference was connected to the groups experiencing different forms of disadvantages.

Therefore, in a further study we wanted to demonstrate that different functions of feeling sorry and outrage on ally action are indeed dependent on the type of

disadvantage the outgroup is experiencing. Furthermore, from our cross-sectional data we did not have evidence about the causal relationship between feeling sorry and collective action intentions on behalf of both politically and economically disadvantaged groups. However, using an experimental design where we manipulated the emotions of a character presented in our vignettes, we could test perceptions of a causal connection between emotion and action.

We manipulated a) the type of disadvantage and b) the emotional reaction of a fictitious ally and compared the effect of perceived emotions of sorry versus outrage on the expected collective action intentions of the ally in light of economic and political versus only political disadvantage. Furthermore, we tested participants' own emotional reaction to the situation and their consequent collective action intentions.

Hypotheses

We expected that when participants had to evaluate a fictitious character's ally action intentions in a situation in which the outgroup was only politically disadvantaged, they would attribute higher collective action intentions when the character showed outrage and lower intentions when he showed feeling sorry. However, we expected no differences in the level of collective action intentions when the outgroup was both politically and economically disadvantaged regardless of the emotions shown by the character. Furthermore, we expected that their own emotional reaction of outrage, but not feeling sorry, would predict intentions to engage in collective action when the outgroup is only politically (but not economically) disadvantaged, but no such differences would be found when the outgroup is both politically and economically disadvantaged.

Method

Procedure. We conducted a 2 (type of disadvantage: economic and political vs. only political) x 2 (emotional response of a fictitious ally: sorry vs. outrage) online experiment. Participants were randomly assigned into one of four conditions and received a description of a disadvantaged group and the emotional reaction to the description of a fictitious ally. Afterwards, we measured the expected behavioral intentions of the fictitious ally and participants' own emotional reactions and behavioral intentions to the two types of disadvantaged groups.

In our fictitious scenario, we introduced an imaginary country, Anduria, where there is a divide between city and village inhabitants (for a full description of the vignettes see Appendix D). All participants learned that village inhabitants were unjustly treated by the government resulting in their lack of political representations and unequal rights. The description of political disadvantage (e.g. examples of transgression of their rights as citizens and their underrepresentation in political decisions) was identical, while the description of the socio-economic status of the group differed. In the combined economic and political disadvantage condition, we emphasized that village inhabitants were also poor and suffered the deprivation of their basic needs. In the political disadvantage condition, village inhabitants only suffered political disadvantages, but were *not* economically deprived and had similar socio-economic status as city inhabitants. We use the terms economic versus political disadvantage to label these conditions to highlight the difference, but it is important to note that the "economic" disadvantage condition also included the same level of political disadvantages. Therefore, we contrasted the presence of two types of disadvantages to only one type of disadvantage to resemble the real-life situations examined in Study 4, 5 and 6.

To strengthen the effect of the manipulation and make it more credible, we used images to demonstrate the focus on economic versus political disadvantage (see images in the Appendix D). In the economic condition, we used a sad and poor boy in shabby clothes, and in the political condition, we used an image of a crossed scale (referring to the Scales of Justice) as a symbol of injustice. However, we cannot distinguish if the text, the image or both conveyed the effect, which we discuss in the limitation section of the study.

We framed and edited our story as a news item that was shared on Facebook by an Andurian citizen from the city (i.e., a potential ally to village inhabitants), named Tamas Simor. To manipulate the emotions related to the story, the Andurian citizen shared the news with a comment that stated in the sorry condition "It makes me deeply sad what these people have to go through just a few miles from us. I feel sorry about their situation." In the outrage condition, his reaction was reworded: "It makes me deeply angry, what these people have to go through just a few miles from us. I am really outraged about their situation." To reinforce the message, the comment was followed either by a sad or an angry emoji, and we added reactions with the same emojis under the post, suggesting that others engaged with the stories using the respective emotions.

Following the presentation of the shared news item with the comment of the fictitious character, we asked participants that based on this information, how likely they think Tamas Simor would engage in collective action and donation. Using this manipulation, we investigated what kind of behavior participants expected from the character of the story as a test of perceptions of normative behaviors depending on the type of disadvantage and emotional reactions of sorry and outrage. This way we could directly manipulate the emotional reaction and test its effect on behavioral intentions, although these were action intentions attributed to a person, not personal behavioral intentions.

Besides manipulating the character's emotions, we measured participants own emotional reactions to the injustices suffered by village inhabitants. We expected that the emotions presented by the fictitious character could communicate norms of emotional reactions, but their own reactions don't necessarily match that of the character of the story. Therefore, after checking whether their own emotional reactions were affected by the emotions presented with the story, we conducted a SEM analysis separately for participants in the economic and the political disadvantage condition, to test whether the pattern of predictions found in Studies 4, 5 and 6 can be replicated within the controlled setting of the experiment where the differences were only connected to the presence or absence of economic disadvantage.

The language of the manipulation and the questionnaire was Hungarian. We report all measures used in the study and all data exclusions in the current paper.

Participants. For an estimation of sample size for the path model, G*Power analysis requested $N = 311$ for 95% power to detect a small effect size of Cohen's $f^2 = .02$ (Cohen, 1988). However, we aimed to reach as high sample size as possible to be able to increase the reliability of results. We recruited participants from two different pools. First, we recruited participants on Facebook ($n = 287$) and offered a raffle price of vouchers of 12.000 HUF (37 Euros). We posted the call on our personal Facebook pages, and asked everyone to share it, the call was also posted in several Facebook groups. Second, we recruited participants from a university course where students participate in research for course credits ($n = 316$). We had 304 participants in the Economic and Political condition, and 299 participants in the Political condition, reaching a total $N = 603$.

There were 140 men and 449 women among respondents, 14 did not report their gender or chose "other". The vast majority of respondents were university students either with a finished secondary school degree (58.5%), or already obtained a higher education degree (39.3%). The average age was 26.2 years (*SD* = 9.8), from 18 to 74 years. The majority of respondents, 49.8% were from the capital, and 34.3% came from another city or town, and 14.3 % from a village.

Measures. We used a manipulation check to measure if participants read the manipulation carefully, so they had to recognize the information that was previously provided in the text. We presented the same statements to all participants about economic and political disadvantage, but correct answers differed across conditions. Economic disadvantage statements were the following: *"The basic needs of families in the villages are not met.", "Villages became poor compared to the cities.", and "Village inhabitants and their children have insecure living conditions."* The following items were used for political disadvantage: "*The rights of village citizens are violated." "Village inhabitants are excluded from political decisions." "Village inhabitants are hindered in their participation in national elections."* Here and in all other measures we used a 7-point Likert type-scale (from 1 = Completely disagree to 7 = Completely agree). We compared the perception of economic and political disadvantage in the two conditions and expected that economic disadvantage was perceived higher in the economic condition, while there was no difference in the perception of disadvantage condition.

We also used an attention check question to see if respondents could recall Tamas Simor's emotional reaction.

Injustice awareness was measured by the same four items as in Study 6, tailored to the fictitious scenario (4 items, $\alpha = .74$).

When measuring action intentions, we first asked about how the fictitious character, Tamas Simor, would act. We used similar items to measure perceived collective action as in Study 4, 5 and 6 (signing petition, participating in demonstration, etc.), but tailored them to the context of Anduria (five items, $\alpha = .86$). Donation intention items were identical to those used in Study 5 and 6 (three items, $\alpha = .81$).

We extended our one-item sorry measures to a three-item version of pro-social emotions, using emotions that are similar to feeling sorry in order to have a more valid measure of emotions. We asked about emotional response in the following way *"Imagine that you are also a citizen of Anduria living in one of the main cities. If you*

think of the situation of village inhabitants to what extent do the following emotions describe what you feel?", we listed feeling sorry, sadness, and sympathy (3 items, α =.80). We also created a scale for outrage, using the words anger, wrath, and outrage (3 items, α =.91).

Finally, we asked participants about their own collective action and donation intentions if they were citizens of Anduria living in a city. We used identical items for their own collective action (α = .82) and donation intentions α = .80) that were used for Tamas Simor.

Results

Attention and manipulation checks. In line with our intentions, we found no differences in injustice awareness between the economic and political conditions, which indicated that adding economic disadvantages did not add to the perception of injustice (Economic condition: M_i 6.01 SD= .84; Political condition: M = 6.03, SD = .87, t(594) = 1.05, p = .294). Similarly, we did not expect or found differences in the perception of political disadvantage between the conditions (Economic condition: M= 6.25, SD = .87; Political condition: M = 6.24, SD = .93, t(596) = .22, p = .825). Finally, in line with our intentions, we expected and found differences in the perception of economic disadvantage between the conditions (Economic condition: M= 6.25 SD = .74; Political condition: M = 3.69, SD = 1.55, t(596) = 25.76, p < .001).

Attention checks related to the emotional response of Tamas Simor showed that not all participants noticed these emotions or could recall them correctly. In the sorry condition, 20 (6.3%) wrongly indicated outrage, 53 (16.7 %) could not recall the emotion. In the outrage condition, 17 (5.9%) wrongly indicated sorry, and 36 (12.5%) could not recall the emotion. Four (1.3%) participants' responses were missing in both conditions (8 participants altogether). As 134 out of 603 participants could not precisely indicate the appropriate emotion, we conducted the analysis with the exclusion of these people. This left us with a sample of 469 participants, 240 in the economic, and 229 in the political condition.

Descriptive statistics. For means, standard deviations and correlations, see Table 10. Collective action and donation intentions attributed to the Andurian citizen in the vignette were high overall, and participants' own action intentions were somewhat lower, but still above the midpoint. Injustice awareness was very high, corresponding to our goal to present a story that represents high level of injustice. Attributed collective

action and donation intentions (to the fictitious character who posted the story) strongly correlated with participant's own collective action and donation intentions, respectively. However, injustice awareness and own emotions were strongly associated with participant's own action intentions, and only weakly connected to attributed action intentions.

Table 10. *Means, standard deviations and correlations of variables of Study 7*

			Correlation						
	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Attributed collective action intention	4.99	1.13	1	.589**	.397**	.176**	.283**	.181**	.144*
2. Attributed donation intention	4.77	1.16		1	.249**	.439**	.211**	.177**	.155**
3. Collection action intention	4.63	1.16			1	.561**	.347**	.496**	.542**
4. Donation intention	4.65	1.29				1	.226**	.457**	.405**
5. Injustice awareness	6.07	0.86					1	.489**	.473**
6. Sorry	5.29	1.12						1	.656**
7. Outrage	4.66	1.47							1

Note. ** $p < .001$, * $p < .05$.

Hypothesis testing with planned comparisons. As we expected that our emotion manipulations had an effect on the attribution of collective action to the fictitious character (but not on own collective action), we conducted planned comparisons between the conditions where he reported feeling sorry versus outrage to compare their effects on attributed collective action. We conducted an analysis within the economic scenario, and one within the political scenario. We chose paired comparisons instead of ANOVA (that could be an intuitive choice with a 2x2 design), because our hypotheses focused on the comparison of the two emotions in the two contexts independently.

Furthermore, we did not expect an interaction between the disadvantage and emotion dimensions, as the two types of disadvantage were not completely different from each other: the economic disadvantage condition also involved political disadvantages.

There was no difference in attributed collective action intention between the sorry condition (where the character expressed feeling sorry) and outrage condition (where the character expressed outrage) in the economic disadvantage scenario. In contrast, in the political scenario, attributed collective action intention was higher in the outrage condition compared to the sorry condition.[3] For descriptive statistics and results of the T-tests, see Table 11.

Table 11

Planned comparisons between emotions on collective action intention

	Economic (n = 240)		Independent samples T-test			
	M	SD	t	df	p	Cohen's d
Sorry	4.85	1.15	-1.81	302	.074	.22
Outrage	5.12	1.25				

	Political (n = 229)		Independent samples T-test			
	M	SD	t	df	p	Cohen'sd
Sorry	4.78	1.21	-3.11	243	.002	.39
Outrage	5.22	1.04				

Hypothesis testing with SEM. Based on participants' own reaction to the economic versus political scenarios, we built the model the same way as in Studies 1–3, where injustice awareness predicted behavior intentions of donation and collective action, and the connection was mediated by feeling sorry and outrage.

Respondents in the different emotion conditions did not differ in their own emotional response to the situation of village inhabitants (Sorry: t(594) = .184, p = .854;

[3] T-test comparisons showed the same results as in the full sample, no difference in collective action intention between sorry and outrage in the economic condition (Sorry: M = 4.98, SD = 1,09; Outrage: M = 5.02, SD = 1.14, t(302) = -.351, p = .726, Cohen's d = .04), and a significant difference between emotions in the political condition (Sorry: M = 4.77, SD = 1.19; Outrage: M = 5.19, SD = 1.07, t(297) = -3.12, p = .002, Cohen's d = .37).

Outrage: t(594) = -1.13, p = .261), suggesting that respondents own emotions were not affected by the presented emotional response of the fictitious ally. Because of the random assignment and because of the lack of effect of this manipulation on their own emotional reaction, we were confident to compare the role of their own emotional responses in predicting their own action intention responses. We conducted two separate analyses on the subsample in the combined economic and political and in the political only conditions. The procedure was identical to the previous studies. For a visual presentation of our results see *Figure 10.*



Figure 10. Predictors of collective action and donation intentions toward economically and only politically disadvantaged groups. The first regression weight refers to the economic disadvantage condition, the second one to the political disadvantage condition.

In the economic disadvantage condition, there were three non-significant paths between variables: the connection between injustice awareness and collective action intention (*B* = .06; *SE* = .08.; p = .430; β = .05), the connection between injustice awareness and donation intention (*B* = -.11; *SE* = .09; p = .219; β = -.07), and the connection between outrage and donation intention (*B* = .07 *SE* = .06; p = .225; β = .08), therefore we trimmed these three paths. The resulting trimmed model showed good fit

to our data ($\chi 2$ = 4.82; df =3, CFI = .996, NFI = .991, RMSEA = .045). Both emotions were significant predictors of behavior intentions, but feeling sorry more strongly predicted collective action intention than outrage. Also, feeling sorry was a stronger predictor of donation intention than outrage. The effect of injustice awareness was mediated by feeling sorry on donation *B* =.355, *p* = .007, 95% CI [.248, .495]) and collective action intention (*B* =.223, *p* = .014, 95% CI [.126, .321]) and by outrage on collective action intention (*B* = .146, *p* = .012, 95% CI [.045, .22]).

We conducted the same analysis for political disadvantage condition. We trimmed the two non-significant paths between injustice awareness and collective action intention (*B* = .098; *SE* = .073; p = .176; β = .072) and between injustice awareness and donation intentions (*B* = -.092; *SE* = .090; p = .308; β = -.062). We had a good model fit to our data ($\chi 2$ = 4.56; df = 2, CFI = .995, NFI = .992, RMSEA = .065). In this condition, outrage was a stronger predictor of collective action intention than feeling sorry. Outrage was also a stronger predictor of donation intention, than sorry. The effect of injustice awareness was mediated by feeling sorry on collective action intention (*B* = .192, *p* = .007, 95% CI [.110, .289]), but the mediation by feeling sorry was not significant on donation intention (*B* = .107, *p* = .080, 95% CI [-.012, .231]). Injustice awareness was mediated by outrage on both donation (*B* = .247, *p* = .008, 95% CI [.135, .379]) and collective action intention (*B* = .318, *p* = .005, 95% CI [.236, .440]).

Discussion of Study 7

We tested the same hypotheses about the role of feeling sorry and outrage in mobilization for collective action as in our previous studies. However, using an experimental design, we controlled for the effect of the type outgroup, and we could test the perceived causal connection between emotional reaction to different types of disadvantages and the action intentions. We tested how the emotional reaction of a fictitious ally predicted attributed action intentions, and also measured how participant's own emotional reactions predicted their own action intentions. In line with our predictions, we found that feeling sorry and outrage were equally relevant emotions in the mobilization for collective action and donation in case of an economically and politically disadvantaged outgroup, and this pattern was identified both in the action intentions attributed to the fictitious character and in their own action intentions. In contrast, in case of an outgroup that was only politically, but not economically

disadvantaged, outrage was a stronger predictor for collective action intention compared to sorry, both when we manipulated emotions and when we measured participants' own emotions. The same pattern emerged in connection with donation intentions.

However, our experiment also had some limitations. With our experimental design we were able to manipulate emotions, but only on the level of perception, but not participant's own emotions. Therefore, our outcome variable was the expected collective action by an ally instead of participants' own collective action intention. Still, by the path model we were also able to investigate the connections between participants' own emotions and collective action intentions in light of the type of outgroup disadvantage. The fact that we received the same results with both methods demonstrated that the perception reflected the real connection between emotions and action intentions.

A futher concern with the experimental method was the artificial division between economic and political versus only political disadvantages. This simplification helped us testing our assumption that the presence or absence of severe economic deprivation has important effect on the perception of groups, and this would influence the role of sorry and behavioral intentions on behalf of them. However, in reality, political disadvantage and its economic consequences are intertwined. At least, the magnitude of economic deprivation differs between groups with different levels of socio-economic status. Division is also hard because minority identities and different layers of disadvantages intersect.

Another problem was that we used images in addition to the description to manipulate the type of disadvantage. By using an image of a child in the economic condition we aimed to reinforce the vignette that also explicitly mentions how children are affected by economic disadvantages, compared to the political condition where children were also mentioned as affected, but on a more abstract level (so we used an abstract image). However, we cannot distinguish whether purely the description or also the image drove the effect of the manipulation which reduces the reliability of our method.

This experiment supported the findings of our correlational studies that revealed the context-specific role of feeling sorry as a motivator of collective action intention. For groups who deal with political underrepresentation and discrimination, as well as economic hardships, ally's emotional reaction of feeling sorry can be just as strong or even stronger motivator for collective action intentions as outrage. However, groups

who struggle with political disadvantages without (severe) socio-economic deprivation, ally's emotional reaction of feeling sorry is a not a functional emotion in mobilization, and in line with vast majority of the collective action literature outrage is the most relevant predictor of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008).

These findings provide experimental evidence for the assumption that feeling sorry and outrage have similar functions when predicting ally collective intentions on behalf of outgroups that are politically *and* economically marginalized, but the functions of feeling sorry and outrage are different when predicting ally collective action that are politically but not economically marginalized.

Discussion of studies on sorry

Prosocial emotions and collective action intentions had an ambivalent relationship in previous research. They were connected more to giving type of action like donation compared to acting type of emotion and less to genuine collective action in some cases (Thomas, & McGarty, 2017), while others suggested that prosocial emotion can play similarly important role in mobilization like outrage. Prosocial emotion motivates collective action in sequence with outrage: empathy motivated outrage, which in turn led to behavioral intentions on behalf of the outgroup (Selvanathan, et al., 2018). Others suggested that the co-existence of sympathy and anger predicted collective action the most efficiently, but not sympathy alone (Fernando et al., 2014). However, no research addressed the specific conditions under which prosocial emotions can have a distinguished role in collective action. We argued that toward both economically and politically deprived groups, feeling sorry leads to prosocial behavioral intentions and even collective action. We conducted Study 4 and 5 to test the pro-social intentions of advantaged group members in intergroup contexts that reflected both large economic and social/political injustices. We argued that sorry for marginalized groups can be a motivator of both donation and collective action. Allyship is not limited to politicized collective action, but it can also take place in the form of donations, as the Roma in Hungary and refugees in Germany and Hungary are equally dependent on material help and the representation of their political interests (Council of Europe, 2012; Mortimer, 2016). In Study 6 we contrasted these models to a model for a group that was socially and politically but not economically disadvantaged, gay people. Finally, in Study 7, we compared the role of sorry and outrage toward an

economically versus politically disadvantaged fictitious group in an experimental design.

Our finding that sorry was connected to injustice awareness, supported our assumption that in these intergroup contexts the socioeconomic and political marginalization are connected, and people with an awareness of injustice feel sorry toward economically marginalized groups. Nevertheless, sorry was a stronger predictor of donation intentions than of collective action intentions in all models connected to economically marginalized groups but predicted both behaviors in all cases. In fact, collective action intentions were more strongly predicted by sorry than by outrage in all three intergroup contexts of Study 4 and 5 (in connection to the Roma and refugees), and also in the scenario of the economically disadvantaged in the experiment of Study 7. We argue that the reason for this is that feeling sorry is a coherent emotional response towards groups in need of material resources where allies recognize the injustice of the situation. In contrast, Study 6 and the scenario of the politically disadvantaged in Study 7 demonstrated that sorry is less relevant when a group is not economically deprived, but "only" socially and politically disadvantaged. Only in connection with gay people and with the fictitious group in the political disadvantage condition, outrage was a more important predictor of collective action. Simply, outrage about policies is a more relevant response to their disadvantage, compared to feeling sorry toward them.

An additional explanation for the stronger effect of sorry compared to outrage concerning the marginalized in Study 4, 5 and 6 may be that sorry is a more sustainable emotion than outrage or anger (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). Outrage is usually connected to the allocation of blame to a third party (e.g. government or an unjust system; Thomas et al., 2009), but in our measurement we did not include a reference to responsible third parties, but only asked if participants feel outrage about the situation of the group in general. Prosocial emotions like sympathy or sorry could be more generally present among members of the advantaged group, as it is an other-focused emotion that could appear even in the absence of a specific reason for grievance (Thomas et al., 2009). Therefore, sorry can be a useful and general basis for mobilization on behalf of the severely deprived.

Our findings suggest that in intergroup contexts with large status differences, the main division is not between actions that maintain the status quo by offering "only" donations versus engaging in politicized actions for social change, but rather between acting at all or not doing anything. The social change potential of a specific action

might be dependent on the intergroup context, therefore donation is not uniformly paternalistic (Becker et al., 2018), it can be an adequate response to a groups' suffering. Helping in the form of donations based on feelings of sorry may be psychologically similar to engagement in political action.

Limitations and future directions

The context-dependent nature of intergroup emotions makes it difficult to distinguish between the prosocial emotions of pity, sympathy, compassion or feeling sorry for someone in different languages. In the present research, we used the umbrella term feeling sorry for someone, by which we aimed to tap into a general prosocial orientation to test how this relates to behavioral intentions compared to outrage in different intergroup contexts. Therefore, we did not focus on the differences between different shades of prosocial emotions, which is also an interesting field for future research. We had a chance to use one-item measure of feeling sorry in the representative data collection, which is a clear limitation of our studies. Therefore, in a university sample in Study 4, we extended the one item measurement of emotions to three items, to investigate if the different emotion words that are used interchangeably in literature can make up a coherent scale of prosocial orientation. As we found a very strong correlation between emotion words of pity, sadness and sympathy, and these items made up a reliable scale, this supported our assumption that these emotion words are indeed really close to each other in meaning.

Across four studies we provide evidence that sorry for marginalized groups may be an indicator of a prosocial approach to relevant groups with good levels of variance explained from a short scale. Most collective action studies use small to medium purposive or convenience samples with scenarios involving imagined transgressions in experimenal design. Our studies used similar measures of collective action but employed survey method with larger samples in Study 4 and 5. A strength of this research is that it investigated ally action intentions with big community samples not only from Western democracies (as most of previous research on collective action was conducted in the US, Australia and Western Europe), but from Eastern Europe. Our main findings were replicated in the German and the Hungarian context, in connection with two real groups, the Roma and refugees. Finally, our findings were supported in an experiment, where we could measure the effect of economic versus political disadvantage on the role of sorry in collective action intention.

Although political action on behalf of the disadvantaged is the most direct tool of social and political change, in specific circumstances, the emotion of sorry and engagement of advantage group members in donation can be coherent responses to the intergroup injustices and economic deprivation in the sense that it reflects the group's vulnerability and need of material resources. Giving a helping hand in the form of donations can function as an opportunity for the advantaged to get involved in activism on behalf of the marginalized to restore social justice. Furthermore, mobilizing a wider pool of advantaged group members to improve the status of disadvantaged groups can be an important step toward achieving the social change that political activists also strive for.

General discussion

In my PhD thesis I investigated the motivations of allyship toward marginalized groups in the non-supportive social context of Hungary. Minority influence can only occur, if members of the minority unite with allies from the majority to put pressure on authorities to bring about structural changes (Subasic & Reynolds, 2008). Therefore, ally collective action is indispensable for social change. It is not evident though, how minorities gain support from the majority, especially those who are marginalized and targets of high hostility and open prejudice, like the Roma or refugees in Hungary. Paradoxically, these groups are in the biggest need for support and rely on the resources, political decisions and policies of the majority the most. I investigated, how research findings about predictors of collective action in Western democracies are applicable to the Hungarian context, where citizens are less active in politics and open expression of prejudice is not a phenomenon of a past.

I focused on the cognitive and emotional aspects of injustice and raised the question how specific framings of injustice are connected to specific collective action intentions, and how specific emotions relate to donation and collective action intentions. Based on the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA, van Zomeren et al., 2008), I focused on affective injustice, namely how cognitive appraisals of intergroup injustice and emotions related to these appraisals influence collective action intention. Besides predictors of collective action, I had to consider factors that counter mobilization. Studies on the demobilization effect highlighted that positive intergroup relations have a sedative effect on minorities' collective action intentions, and intergroup harmony can veil injustice awareness and perceived discrimination among minorities. Allies also have the responsibility in countering this effect, as this is a result of intergroup dynamics between high and low status groups.

According to lessons learned from studies on privilege awareness in Western contexts, privilege awareness decreases modern prejudice (which is an obstacle to collective action intention in these contexts), and it is related to collective action intentions, therefore a "just friend" is someone who acknowledges and also communicates privilege (Becker et al, 2013). When we turn to the Eastern Europe, and specifically the Hungarian context, it is not modern prejudice like in the Western context, but open prejudice expression that is present toward marginalized groups like the Roma and refugees in both public and interpersonal communication. Therefore, we

cannot speak about the "irony of harmony" (Saguy et al., 2009) in this context, because these intergroup relations are openly hostile. This leads to a different interpretation of privilege in this context that functions more as a threat to the positive image of the majority than as a motivator of collective action intention.

In the first part of the dissertation, I presented a study that we conducted based on an extension of an experimental paradigm was used in a Western context (Blacks versus Whites in the US) by Powell and colleagues (2005). Privilege versus disadvantage framings of injustice were tested in their effect on intergroup helping and collective action intentions. In Study 1, we used a university sample and tested both types of manipulations (item list and item generation of privilege and disadvantage) that were used in the original study, but we tailored them to the Roma outgroup (N = 132). We did not find differences between conditions in measured outcomes (privilege awareness, sympathy and guilt), but only found that the textual responses showed a general backlash effect of confrontation with both privilege and disadvantage conditions. Some participants expressed irritation by the manipulation and expressed their prejudice toward the Roma openly. Others reported ambivalence toward the Roma, low efficacy in bringing about change and justifications for their prejudice. We concluded that hostility toward the Roma was too high among participants, therefore injustice framings did not convey any effects in their privilege awareness or intergroup emotions.

We wanted to test if manipulations make a difference in attitudes and action intentions toward a less rejected outgroup (similarly to the original study). Therefore, in Study 2 we let participants choose from more intergroup contexts, where they assessed outgroups as disadvantaged, or groups toward which they felt their own privilege (so we expected less backlash compared to Study 1). Participants were again university students (N = 169), and they could choose from outgroups like the poor, poorly educated people, village inhabitants and the Roma. We expected that those who choose the Roma as a disadvantaged group voluntarily are less biased toward them, but this was not supported: those who chose the Roma as an outgroup, reported higher hostility compared to those with the other choices. Again, we observed a backlash effect: participants in the disadvantage condition chose intergroup helping intention less, and chose non-action more than those in the control condition (who were not confronted with outgroup disadvantage).

At the same time, when they had to choose between the support of a dependency- versus autonomy-oriented NGO, the vast majority chose the latter. This suggests that participants recognized the importance of large-scale, structural changes compared to donation, but when it came to their own contribution, they preferred the easier way (by only decreasing disadvantage) compared to choosing action that brings about social change. Similarly to Study 1, our findings demonstrated how high hostility toward the Roma influenced the recognition of injustice in the intergroup context, and also collective action intentions. The only positive change was a decrease in the perceived responsibility of the outgroup, when participants were confronted with disadvantages of the outgroup, but not when they were confronted with their privilege.

It was an interesting finding that privilege awareness was relatively high in the sample (independent from conditions), but at the same time, perceived responsibility of the ingroup (that could be a logical consequence of privilege awareness) was rather low. In line with this, guilt and sympathy toward the outrgroup was low as well, and they were not affected by confrontation with privilege and disadvantage. According to this, privilege awareness in this context functions differently from the Western contexts where previous studies took place, and where privilege awareness is related to ingroup responsibility, guilt and solidarity with the outgroup (Montgomery & Stewart, 2012).

Study 3 supported our expectation that privilege awareness has weaker connection with behavioral intentions, and the effect of privilege awareness is greatly dependent on perceived efficacy (N = 1007). Privilege awareness motivated collective action much more strongly among those who believed that social change was possible by engaging in collective action together. In contrast, disadvantage awareness was a stronger predictor of collective action intention than privilege awareness. This explains our finding that participants were more responsive for the other-focus of the disadvantage condition in Study 2, and that the only thing our manipulation changed is the perceived responsibility of the outgroup.

At the same time, participants were aware of disadvantages and privileges, they listed examples of both in all chosen intergroup contexts, and they also recognized that autonomy-oriented helping is more ideal than dependency- oriented helping. In contrast to these insights, their prosocial intergroup emotions (like guilt and sympathy) and action intentions were not in line with their appraisals of disadvantage and privilege.

Our studies demonstrated some hurdles, why cognitive framings of injustice were not enough to influence emotions and action intentions. One hurdle is open prejudice toward the Roma and the high perceived responsibility of the Roma in their own status. Backlash effects in Study 1 and in Study 2 highlighted participants' frustration and justification efforts of their prejudiced attitudes and non-action. Secondly, even if participants are ready to acknowledge unjust privilege, low perceived efficacy about changes prevent them from action intentions. Thirdly, participants were less willing to react positively to the self-focus of privilege, and more willing to rethink outgroup responsibility as a response to other-focus disadvantage. This suggests that in a hostile context, the first step for mobilization is changing the perception of the outgroup, by acknowledging its unjust disadvantage and decreasing their perceived responsibility in their situation. Confrontation with own responsibility and privilege should be a next step. This is just the opposite pattern that Powell's original study suggested, where the self-focus of privilege made participants more willing to recognize the unfair intergroup situation, compared to the other focus of disadvantage.

We can interpret these different findings by the different contexts: in the supportive Western context, where there is consensus on the injustice of outgroup disadvantage, privilege-focus can bring new insights for advantaged group members in their view of the intergroup situation. In contrast, in a non-supportive Eastern- European context, where there is not even consensus on the injustice of outgroup disadvantage (as a result of prejudice and responsibility attributed to the outgroup), the key for mobilization is in other-focused cognitions and emotions. Questioning own responsibility and privilege can come as a next step.

In the second part of the dissertation, I tested the role of specific intergroup emotions in donation and collective action intentions toward marginalized groups. Allyship for marginalized groups, who face structural disadvantages in society (like the Roma and refugees) was expected to have specific predictors compared to other groups that do not face such severe economic deprivation. Economically disadvantaged groups have special needs in society, as they are not only targets of discrimination and violation of their rights as citizens, but lack resources and are in need of material help as well. Therefore, allyship on behalf of them can be expressed in multiple ways: standing up for their rights in a demonstration, but also in the form of intergroup helping and donation for NGO's that support their cause. My assumption was that predictors of collective action and donation would differ in case of economically disadvantaged

groups, compared to not economically, but politically disadvantaged groups with higher socio-economic status.

I expected the cognitive appraisal of injustice (in other words, a recognition of unjust outgroup disadvantage) to be a basis for mobilization. My main hypothesis was that besides the classic mobilizing emotion of outrage, the other-focused prosocial emotion of sorry would also predict collective action and donation intentions on behalf of marginalized groups. In contrast, outrage is a more relevant predictor compared to sorry in case of politically disadvantaged groups who do not face economic hardships. We tested our assumptions with structural equation modelling.

In Study 4, we tested if sorry predicted collective action and donation intentions on the basis of injustice awareness. We used survey data collected on a representative sample among majority participants, and the target group was the Roma. Our findings supported our expectation that sorry was a predictor of both collective action intention and donation, and it turned out to be an even stronger predictor than outrage.

In Study 5 we tested the same model in connection with refugees as a target group, in a Hungarian representative sample and in a German convenience sample. We argued that Roma and refugees are similar in the sense that they are marginalized groups who face both economic disadvantaged (i.e., in need of material help) and political disadvantages, therefore we had the same predictions here as in Study 4. In both societal context, we found the same pattern that sorry was a stronger predictor of collective action and donation than outrage.

In Study 6, we wanted to contrast the pattern we found with both economically and politically disadvantaged groups to a group that faces political, but no economic disadvantage, thus we relied on gay people as the outgroup using a university sample. We expected that outrage would be a stronger predictor of collective action than sorry, and this hypothesis was supported by the data.

Finally, in Study 7, we tested the different role of sorry in collective action intention toward economically and politically disadvantaged groups in a fictitious scenario in an experiment among university students. With experimental method we could control that the only difference between target groups were economic versus political disadvantage. We could also test causal relationships between sorry and behavioral intentions. In line with our findings in the survey studies, sorry was a stronger predictor of collective action than outrage on behalf of economically

disadvantaged groups. However, on behalf of politically, but not economically disadvantaged groups, outrage was a stronger predictor than sorry.

Our findings question the dichotomy of benevolent support versus activist support, namely that prosocial emotion is a prototypical predictor of prosocial action intention (e.g. intergroup helping or donation) that lacks social change intention, while outrage is a prototypical predictor for collective action intention that leads to genuine social change. This distinction suggested that forms of prosocial action are less worthy than classic forms of political actions as they are less likely lead to social change. Furthermore, prosocial emotions and prosocial actions can function as tools for maintaining the status quo by advantaged groups, who tend to use benevolence strategically (see Van Leeuwen, & Täuber, 2010; Nadler, 2009) to veil real structural problems and their genuine solutions in order to preserve their high status.

Our findings suggested that on behalf of marginalized groups, sorry is not necessarily a less valuable intergroup emotion than outrage in terms of social change orientation, and donation intention is not necessarily more patronizing than collective action intention when groups are in need of material help. Instead, both actions can be adequate forms of allyship. Emotions of sorry and outrage, and donation and collective action intentions are intertwined in these contexts, as different types of disadvantage, like economic and political disadvantage are related among these groups. Therefore, both forms of action can be relevant in the support of these groups. For example, intergroup helping and activism were hand in hand among volunteers in the refugee crisis, where the distinction was not between "only benevolent" help or higher valued collective action, but supportive behavior versus non- action or hostility (Kende et al., 2016). Our results demonstrate that prosocial emotions and action on behalf of marginalized groups should be viewed in a different light than prosocial emotions toward politically (but not economically) disadvantaged groups where benevolence might have a backlash or system-maintaining function. In a hostile context where open prejudice expression toward minorities is still an issue, prosocial emotions toward these groups should be viewed as an important stepping stone toward solidarity.

At the same time, I don't aim to suggest that sorry is an ideal emotion that mobilizing interventions should promote. I also don't want to deny how harmful benevolent attitudes toward specific groups can be when they are used strategically by advantaged groups to maintain unequal status relations. Instead, I suggest that sorry can be a relevant emotional response when it comes to economically deprived groups, and

especially in a hostile intergroup context. In these contexts, it is an indicator of positive attitudes that are the basis for mobilization for the benefit of outgroups.

Mobilization is easier for incidental causes that makes an injustice salient and that raises outrage among people. However, outrage is an intensive emotion with high arousal, therefore it is not sustainable on the long term. This is also the reason why waves of protests get exhausted with time, as outrage and anger are hard to maintain. In contrast, sorry is lower in arousal, but still able to raise frustration and motivate action for change, while it can also last over time. Finally, we need to acknowledge that it is related to benevolence and the lack of prejudice and hostility toward the outgroup, the biggest hurdles in the way of solidarity in a non-supportive context.

Limitations and future directions

In my PhD thesis I focused on cognitive and emotional aspects of injustice in collective action intentions. Because of this narrow focus, I put less emphasis on other important factors that influence mobilization on behalf of outgroups. Social identity is one factor that I did not focus on but used in the interpretation of my findings. In the first part of my dissertation, the self-focus of the privilege condition raised the issue how participants reacted to the confrontation with their own responsibility in the intergroup situation and whether privilege posed a threat to their social identity, or it could lead them to action. Backlash effects in the experiments demonstrated that privilege was more a threat to participants than a motivation for change. However, not only the self-focus was threatening to them, but also the other-focus, yet they seemed to be more receptive to the latter, as they were willing to reconsider the responsibility of the outgroup after the confrontation with outgroup disadvantage. This suggested that the first step in the way to solidarity is the decrease in hostility toward the outgroup.

Perceived efficacy was another factor I paid less attention to, but it is an important factor in the causes of passivity, and the weak influence of privilege awareness. Participants also reported their low efficacy beliefs and used them as justification of prejudice and non-action. Limited findings of the privilege studies can be interpreted by comparing supportive Westerns versus non-supportive Eastern European contexts. As I did not make a direct comparison between contexts, and I did not measure variables connected to the context that could account for these differences, I can only speculate these reasons.

In a future research I plan to concentrate more on the characteristics of the majority group, and the causes of their low efficacy perceptions and low responsibility they take for outgroups. Important factors here are the threatened social identity of the majority (Grant & Brown, 1995), competitive victimhood (Noor, Vollhardt, Mari & Nadler 2017), and relative deprivation (Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012) that could be accounted for in future research. If participants believe that their own group is under threat, they think they are not the ones who possess resources and able to help others, but they are the victims in need of help, and these factors will prevent them from taking action on behalf of outgroups. For example, in another line of research, we demonstrated the relevance of the exclusiveness of citizenship in predicting collective action. A more inclusive citizen identity increased advantaged member's willingness for engaging in prosocial action on behalf of Muslims and the Roma, compared to a more exclusive ethnic understanding of citizenship (Kende, Lantos, & Krekó, 2018).

Another limitation to my doctoral research is that I measured collective action intentions throughout my studies, but not actual collective action participation. Firstly, a reason for this was that measuring actual behavior requires even more complex experimental designs. Secondly, in my survey studies I did not want to investigate the motivation of an active minority who participated in collective action before, but I wanted to investigate general predictors of solidarity among the advantaged. Using proximate measures for collective action is also a general critique in the literature of collective action as experiments usually rely on behavior intentions more than behavior. However, there is strong empirical evidence that action intenions are good proxies for actual behavior, as it was also stated in theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), namely that behavioral intentions are mediators between attitudes and behavior. For example, in a longitudinal study, behavioral intentions predicted actual behavior two years later (De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999), and a meta-analyis also showed a strong correlation between intention and action (Armitage & Christian, 2003). Furthermore, collective action intentions also communicate what participants hold as a normative behavior (Bliuc et al, 2007), therefore I can interpret my findings in the light of the specific context. However, the reliability of my findings can be increased by extending measures to measurements of actual behavior in the future.

Finally, we can take a critical perpective on the research on collective action in general. Collective action was usually investigated as a tool for social change toward a more democratic, equal, and just society, and political participation was depicted as the most appropriate and moral form of behavior, in contrast to strategic efforts of the advantaged group to maintain the status quo. However, activist forms of behavior might take much more cost in contexts of oppression where dissents of the system might face severe punishment for open resistance. It is also not guaranteed that political action in such contexts would not make the situation worse not only for the individual but the whole group who oppose the status quo by raising threat in authorities who in turn might increase oppression. We followed a similar argument when we raised that prosocial action that seem to be paternalistic is specific contexts, can function as protest behavior in other less supportive contexts.

In a general reflection on collective action research, Kende (2016) suggests that by concentrating mainly on movements addressing changes in status of minorities in society, social psychologists can also be viewed as agents or activists of social change, as they intend to create applicable knowledge to influence policies and recommendations by state actors and NGO's. Still, they have to stay objective and reflect on their choice of topics and their subjective relation to it as well. For example, mobilization for populist right-wing movements was less in the focus of social psychological research, which is also a timely and important topic to investigate.

Conclusions

In my PhD dissertation I investigated motivations and obstacles of ally collective action on behalf of marginalized groups in different contexts. By using different intergroup contexts, I found that high hostility toward a marginalized group can cause backlash effect when confronting with intergroup injustice on a cognitive level. People are more resistant when it comes to their own privilege and responsibility, but more open when they have to reconsider their attitude toward an outgroup. In contrast to the Western context, where there is consensus on being supportive with the disadvantaged, and the goal is to raise more awareness on intergroup injustice and ingroup responsibility (with the motto: “Be not just a friend, but a just friend”), in the Hungarian context, open prejudice is still an issue, and there is no consensensual norm of supporting the disadvantaged. Therefore, the recognition of unjust outgroup disadvantage is the first step, and reconsidering ingroup responsibility can follow. On the basis of injustice awareness, prosocial emotion of sorry can be viewed in a different light: not as a patronizing emotion that is harmful for genuine collective action, but as a stepping stone in solidarity.

Context matters: both the level of hostility in the intergroup situation, and the supportive versus non-supportive context where allyship takes place. Forms and predictors of collective action will be specific when it comes to marginalized groups in hostile intergroup contexts.

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